Humans undergo robust ontogenetic shifts in the theory of mind capabilities. Are these developmental changes unique to human development or are they shared with other closely related non-human species? To explore this issue, we tested the development of the theory of mind capacities in a population of 236 infant and juvenile rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta). Using a looking-time method, we examined what developing monkeys know about others' perceptions. Specifically, we tested whether younger monkeys predict that a person will reach for an object where she last saw it. Overall, we found a significant interaction between a monkey's age and performance on this task (p = .014). Juvenile monkeys (between two and 5 years of age) show a nonsignificant trend towards human infant-like patterns of performance, looking longer during the unexpected condition as compared to the expected condition, though this difference is nonsignificant (p = .09). However, contrary to findings in human infants, infant rhesus macaques show a different trend. Infant monkeys on average look slightly longer on average during the expected condition than the unexpected condition, though this pattern was not significant (p = .06). Our developmental results in monkeys provide some hints about the development of the theory of mind capacities in non-humans. First, young rhesus macaques appear to show some interest in the perception of other agents. Second, young rhesus seems able to make predictions based on the visual perspective of another agent, though the developmental pattern of this ability is not as clear nor as robust as in humans. As such, though an understanding of others' perceptions is earlyemerging in human infants, it may require more experience interacting with other social agents in our non-human relatives. K E Y W O R D S development, macaques, social cognition, theory of mind 1 | INTRODUCTION As we navigate our social world, we readily ascribe intentions, perceptions, desires, and knowledge to other beings. Unsurprisingly to those of us studying non-human primates (hereafter, primates), humans are not alone in these abilities. Indeed many of our closest relatives share the capacity to reason about others' mental experiences (for a review see Rosati, Santos, & Hare, 2010). Nevertheless, the degree to which primates represent others' mental experiences is largely a point of contention, as decades of research suggest that primates may not be quite as sophisticated in their mentalizing abilities as humans (