Rigor Mortis or Rigor, More Tests: Necessity, Sufficiency, and Deterrence Logic

Abstract

The critique of rational deterrence constitutes one of the most comprehensive and sustained attacks on a "theory" in the field of international relations, a theory that many still believe is a sound, parsimonious, policy-relevant explanation of both human-social and military-strategic behavior. The attempt to identify the theoretical problems that plague the theory's behavioral assumptions, 1 the methodological errors embedded within a great deal of deterrence literature, 2 and the practical problems associated with implementing deterrence as a strategy 3 encompass the main thrusts of the critique. As Fischoff (1987:73) claims in his summary of the findings from this body of work, "deterrence emerges as a shabby parody of a scientific theory. Its fundamental behavioral assumptions are wrong. Its basic terms are ill-defined. It is used in inconsistent and contradictory ways. Commonly cited examples of effective deterrence are often based on flawed readings of history, sometimes reflecting ignorance, sometimes deliberate misrepresentation." Like Fischoff, many remain convinced that these findings provide more than enough evidence to discard deterrence as a weak, if not irrelevant, theory of crisis management behavior. In this article I highlight several fundamental problems with the logic and evidence cited by critics to draw these conclusions.The argument develops in five stages. The first outlines the elements of the main "necessary" condition hypothesis most frequently cited, tested, and rejected by critics of deterrence theory. The second section describes nine additional deterrence hypotheses derived from the logic of necessity and sufficiency, and specifies the relationship between these core hypotheses and the empirical evidence required to support and/or refute them. The third introduces the methodology used to test each hypothesis. It is followed by the fourth stage: discussion of data and findings. I conclude International Studies Quarterly (1998) 42, 675-707

Indirect Policing: Its Theory, Mechanism, and Application to Combatting Elusive Perpetrators

“…The Soviet-oriented Sandinistas (FSLN) took power and even supported the left-wing guerrilla organization (FMLN 77 It is apparently too hasty to attribute these regime changes solely to U.S. intervention, but at the same time, it is probably too naïve to deny the U.S. influence in these regions. 78 Proponents and those in favor of deterrence include: Achen and Snidal 1989;Danilovic 2001;Harvey 1995;Harvey 1998;Huth 1988a;Huth 1988b;Huth 1990;Huth and Russett 1984;Huth and Russett 1988;Huth and Russett 1990;Huth and Russett 1993;Lieberman 1994;Signarino and Tarar 2006. countermeasure against them. We hope that our theoretical framework will contribute to the future discussion on how to counteract diversifying threats.…”

“…20 Accordingly, Defender must thus possess an additional qualification-well-functioning 17 For the qualifications for a deterrer, see Bowen 2004, 59;Harvey 1998;Lebow 1981, 85-89;Levy 1988, 486;Wilner 2011, 31. The qualifications are closely associated with the following four variables: (i) balance of military forces; (ii) balance of interests; (iii) reputation or behavior in past crises; (iv) signaling behavior.…”

Transnational policing: preemption and deterrence against elusive perpetrators

“…Before introducing the formal model, we informally theorize deterrence against perpetrators, based upon classical deterrence theory and its criticisms (Bowen 2004: 59;Harvey 1998;Lebow 1981: 85-89;Levy 1988: 486;Wilner 2011: 31). We maintain that deterrence against perpetrators (such as crackers, pirates, and terrorist networks) comprises the following three tasks: (Bowen 2004: 68;Gray 2003, 453;Levy 1988;Wilner 2011: 31).…”

“…The discussion above is a modification of classical deterrence theory that overlooks the necessity of 8 Some perpetrators are so fanatical that they have no or little secular value to hold dear (Betts 2002;Knopf 2008: 229;Trager and Zagorcheva 2005/05: 87;Wilner 2011: 4). intelligence as the deterrer's qualification as well as unity, visibility, and return address as the deterree's qualifications (Bowen 2004: 59;Harvey 1998;Lebow 1981: 85-89;Levy 1988: 486;Wilner 2011: 31). This is presumably because the targets of U.S. deterrence during the Cold-War era were almost exclusively overt adversaries-the Soviet Union and its allies-which trivially met these qualifications.…”

“…is often difficult for Defender to credibly convince potential Perpetrators of future retaliation (Bowen 2004: 59;Harvey 1998;Lebow 1981: 85-89;Levy 1988: 486;Wilner 2011: 31). This problem is plausible because 's decision to punish is made only after the perpetration takes place.…”