The critique of rational deterrence constitutes one of the most comprehensive and sustained attacks on a "theory" in the field of international relations, a theory that many still believe is a sound, parsimonious, policy-relevant explanation of both human-social and military-strategic behavior. The attempt to identify the theoretical problems that plague the theory's behavioral assumptions, 1 the methodological errors embedded within a great deal of deterrence literature, 2 and the practical problems associated with implementing deterrence as a strategy 3 encompass the main thrusts of the critique. As Fischoff (1987:73) claims in his summary of the findings from this body of work, "deterrence emerges as a shabby parody of a scientific theory. Its fundamental behavioral assumptions are wrong. Its basic terms are ill-defined. It is used in inconsistent and contradictory ways. Commonly cited examples of effective deterrence are often based on flawed readings of history, sometimes reflecting ignorance, sometimes deliberate misrepresentation." Like Fischoff, many remain convinced that these findings provide more than enough evidence to discard deterrence as a weak, if not irrelevant, theory of crisis management behavior. In this article I highlight several fundamental problems with the logic and evidence cited by critics to draw these conclusions.The argument develops in five stages. The first outlines the elements of the main "necessary" condition hypothesis most frequently cited, tested, and rejected by critics of deterrence theory. The second section describes nine additional deterrence hypotheses derived from the logic of necessity and sufficiency, and specifies the relationship between these core hypotheses and the empirical evidence required to support and/or refute them. The third introduces the methodology used to test each hypothesis. It is followed by the fourth stage: discussion of data and findings. I conclude International Studies Quarterly (1998) 42, 675-707

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Abstract.The almost universally accepted explanation for the Iraq war is very clear and consistent, namely, the US decision to attack Saddam Hussein's regime on March 19, 2003, was a product of the ideological agenda, misguided priorities, intentional deceptions and grand strategies of President George W. Bush and prominent “neoconservatives” and “unilateralists” on his national security team. Notwithstanding the widespread appeal of this version of history, however, the Bush-neocon war thesis (which I have labelledneoconism) remains an unsubstantiated assertion, a “theory” without theoretical content or historical context, a position lacking perspective and a seriously underdeveloped argument absent a clearly articulated logical foundation.Neoconismis, in essence, a popular historical account that overlooks a substantial collection of historical facts and relevant causal mechanisms that, when combined, represent a serious challenge to the core premises of accepted wisdom. This article corrects these errors, in part, by providing a much stronger account of events and strategies that pushed the US-UK coalition closer to war. The analysis is based on both factual and counterfactual evidence, combines causal mechanisms derived from multiple levels of analysis and ultimately confirms the role of path dependence and momentum as a much stronger explanation for the sequence of decisions that led to war.Résumé.L'explication quasi-universellement acceptée de la guerre d'Irak est très claire et sans équivoque : la décision des États-Unis de renverser le régime de Saddam Hussein le 19 mars 2003 était le résultat d'un programme idéologique, de priorités erronées, de déceptions intentionnelles, de grandes manœuvres stratégiques du président George W. Bush, d'éminents «néoconservateurs» et partisans de l'« unilatéralisme » présents dans l'équipe chargée de la sécurité nationale. Certes cette version de l'histoire constitue une idée largement répandue, mais la thèse de la guerre-néocon-de-Bush – que je désigne sous le terme neoconism – demeure une assertion dénuée de fondements, une ‘théorie’ sans contenu théorique ou contexte historique, un point de vue sans perspective, un argument qui ne fait pas de poids, et qui ne repose sur aucun raisonnement logique clairement articulé. Le neoconism est essentiellement un compte rendu historique populaire qui néglige une ensemble important de faits historiques et de mécanismes de causalité pertinents qui, mis ensemble, constituent un défi taille aux principaux prémisses de la sagesse acceptée. Le présent article se propose de corriger en partie les erreurs surévoquées, en en fournissant un compte rendu beaucoup plus solide des faits et stratégies qui ont amené la coalition États-Unis – Royaume-Uni à aller en guerre contre le régime irakien d'alors. L'analyse se fonde à la fois sur des preuves factuelles et contrefactuelles, avec l'appui des mécanismes de cause à effet inspirés de différents niveaux d'analyse, et confirme enfin le rôle joué par le concept de Path dependence (Dépendance au chemin emprunté) et de la dynamique comme explication beaucoup plus convaincante de la série de décisions ayant conduit à la guerre.

IntroductionThe literature on evolutionary theory tends to address questions of ethnicity from two perspectives: (1) m a c r o , or long-term selection processes associated with basic human preferences for individual or group survival, ethnic identity or kinship affiliati~ns;~ and (2) i n t e r m e -Abstract. Building on rich traditions in economics, biology, sociology and philosophy, evolutionary theories of human and soc~al behaviour are receiving serious treatment in the fields of international relations and world politics. This article explores the logical errors, theoret~cal weaknesses and empirical anomalies that plague evolutionary explanations of ethnic violence and war. The collapse of the former Yugoslavia is used as the primary source of evidence, although reference to other ethnic conflicts help support the main arguments. A comprehensive assessment of evolutionary and primordial theories is important for three reasons: ( I ) crises characterized by ethnic rivalry are a major source of violence and war in a post-Cold War system; (2) there is widespread acceptance in academic and policy communities that primordial explanations are sufficient to account for the v~olence; and (3) officials In the United States, Europe and Canada continue to depend on these explanations to establish limits on their intervention strategies, and to justify their collective reluctance to get involved in wars motivated by this kind of ethnic rivalry.6 John Tooby and Leda Cosmides. "The Psychological Foundations of Culture," in

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