Deterrence and ethnic conflict: The case of Bosnia‐Herzegovina, 1993–94

Harvey, Frank P.

doi:10.1080/09636419708429318

Cited by 13 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…(p. 52) 8 Some might argue that RS16 and RS32 should not be included among possible scenarios since they don't appear to represent relevant deterrence activity. However, both the Huth and Russett (1988) and Harvey (1997aHarvey ( , 1997b datasets, described later in the paper, include cases that correspond to these types of exchanges.…”

Section: Sufficient But Not Necessarymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, both theHuth and Russett (1988) andHarvey (1997aHarvey ( , 1997b datasets, described later in the paper, include cases that correspond to these types of exchanges.…”

mentioning

confidence: 96%

“…A valid test of necessity requires, among other things, evidence of failure when one or more of the conditions was absent, as occurred in almost half of Lebow's thirteen cases-Bosnia 1908-9, Rhineland 1936, Munich 1938-9, Morocco 1905-6, and Berlin 1948 In sum, only a fraction of "relevant" evidence has been compiled to establish whether communication, commitment, capability, and resolve are all necessary conditions for deterrence success. Although this particular hypothesis represents the version of deterrence that is most often cited, tested, and rejected by critics of the theory (Lebow, 1981;Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, 1985;Lebow and Stein, 1989a, 1989b, 1990, it is almost always tested with a methodology and body of evidence appropriate for establishing joint sufficiency, as noted by Achen and Snidal (1989), Most and Starr (1989), Dion (1996), Braumoeller and Goertz (1997), Harvey (1997aHarvey ( , 1997b, and others. By implication, much of the case-study evidence compiled by critics is not entirely appropriate for identifying (let alone testing for) necessary conditions of deterrence success or failure, is obviously inappropriate as a basis for rejecting the most commonly criticized version of the theory, and represents only a portion of the data required for a balanced evaluation of deterrence, in terms of both theory and strategy.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Rigor Mortis or Rigor, More Tests: Necessity, Sufficiency, and Deterrence Logic

Harvey

1998

Int Studies Q

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The critique of rational deterrence constitutes one of the most comprehensive and sustained attacks on a "theory" in the field of international relations, a theory that many still believe is a sound, parsimonious, policy-relevant explanation of both human-social and military-strategic behavior. The attempt to identify the theoretical problems that plague the theory's behavioral assumptions, 1 the methodological errors embedded within a great deal of deterrence literature, 2 and the practical problems associated with implementing deterrence as a strategy 3 encompass the main thrusts of the critique. As Fischoff (1987:73) claims in his summary of the findings from this body of work, "deterrence emerges as a shabby parody of a scientific theory. Its fundamental behavioral assumptions are wrong. Its basic terms are ill-defined. It is used in inconsistent and contradictory ways. Commonly cited examples of effective deterrence are often based on flawed readings of history, sometimes reflecting ignorance, sometimes deliberate misrepresentation." Like Fischoff, many remain convinced that these findings provide more than enough evidence to discard deterrence as a weak, if not irrelevant, theory of crisis management behavior. In this article I highlight several fundamental problems with the logic and evidence cited by critics to draw these conclusions.The argument develops in five stages. The first outlines the elements of the main "necessary" condition hypothesis most frequently cited, tested, and rejected by critics of deterrence theory. The second section describes nine additional deterrence hypotheses derived from the logic of necessity and sufficiency, and specifies the relationship between these core hypotheses and the empirical evidence required to support and/or refute them. The third introduces the methodology used to test each hypothesis. It is followed by the fourth stage: discussion of data and findings. I conclude International Studies Quarterly (1998) 42, 675-707

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Section: Sufficient But Not Necessarymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, both theHuth and Russett (1988) andHarvey (1997aHarvey ( , 1997b datasets, described later in the paper, include cases that correspond to these types of exchanges.…”

mentioning

confidence: 96%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Rigor Mortis or Rigor, More Tests: Necessity, Sufficiency, and Deterrence Logic

Harvey

1998

Int Studies Q

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“…The main problem, in this view, is in making the threats credible. For instance, Harvey analyzes the Bosnia conflict and finds that early threats lacked credibility (Harvey ). Scholars also explore how humanitarian intervention can be squared with international law and the rights of sovereignty and what are the mechanics of doing it properly (Chalk et al ; Cooper and Kohler ; Evans ; Hamburg ; Sewell, Raymond, and Chin ).…”

Section: The Logic Of Humanitarian Interventionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Road to Hell? Third‐Party Intervention to Prevent Atrocities

Kydd

Straus

2013

American J Political Sci

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Preventing large-scale atrocities has emerged as an important policy goal of the post-Cold War period. However, a debate exists about the effects of creating an international institution to prevent atrocities. Advocates of intervention argue that a credible threat to intervene should deter perpetrators and stop atrocities when deterrence fails. Critics argue that third-party intervention, by strengthening weak minority groups and lowering the cost of war, encourages rebellions and so makes war and atrocities more likely. We develop a model of intervention to analyze this debate. The model shows that the negative effects of intervention highlighted by critics can be mitigated if the third party is relatively neutral and if alternative costs are imposed on decision makers. We conclude that with appropriate institutional design, the net impact of stronger third-party commitments to end atrocities will be to lower the expected level of atrocities.

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“…A third problem is that not enough scholarly attention has been given to the special characteristics of (extended) deterrence in ethnic conflicts. For example, although Harvey (1997) provides important insights in this regard, he does not elaborate on the difference between extended deterrence in ethnic conflicts and extended deterrence in state versus state conflicts.…”

Section: Deterrence and Rogue Statesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory-Toward a New Research Agenda

Lupovici

2010

International Studies Quarterly

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In this paper, I aim to review recent empirical and theoretical developments in the study of deterrence. I suggest that an emerging wave of literature currently represents a revival in this field. However, unlike the previous waves, in which theoretical and empirical questions were studied together (realism and nuclear deterrence), in the emerging deterrence literature these two are isolated from each other. The theoretical trend of this wave is evident in new constructivist and interpretative scholarship that explores the practices of deterrence and has provided significant insights, chiefly with regard to classical empirical questions of state versus state and nuclear deterrence. The empirical trend of this wave can be seen through the work of scholars who are considering how to deter ''new'' threats-such as terrorism, rogue states, and ethnic conflicts-mainly by incorporating the traditional realist approach to deterrence. By reviewing these two trends in the current wave of deterrence writing, I demonstrate the advantages of each and suggest that the study of deterrence may benefit from their integration.Following Robert Jervis' seminal work of 1979, in which he reviewed the theories of deterrence and differentiated among their three waves of development, 2 I suggest that we are currently facing the emergence of a fourth wave. More specifically, I posit that this wave is made up of two isolated trends. The first trend is theoretical and is evident through emerging interpretative deterrence research. The second trend is empirical and has evolved around the questions of how to deter terrorists and rogue states and to prevent ethnic conflicts. In general, these studies counter the ''new'' threats through extensions of traditional Cold War deterrence theories. 3 I argue that these two trends have surprisingly little influence on each other.

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Deterrence and ethnic conflict: The case of Bosnia‐Herzegovina, 1993–94

Cited by 13 publications

References 19 publications

Rigor Mortis or Rigor, More Tests: Necessity, Sufficiency, and Deterrence Logic

Rigor Mortis or Rigor, More Tests: Necessity, Sufficiency, and Deterrence Logic

The Road to Hell? Third‐Party Intervention to Prevent Atrocities

The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory-Toward a New Research Agenda

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