All data from reported HPAI outbreaks in the period 2005 -2015 were collected and analysed with respect to its value for quantifying transmission of HPAI to other flocks, preferably in the form of a transmission kernel. The strain type, farm type and host species was taken into account. In total 345 outbreaks were registered. To quantify transmission to other flocks, the traced contacts are relevant. Even more interesting than the traced contacts, is the transmission to neighbouring farms, since it helps in quantifying the unspecified routes of infections, which cannot easily be prevented with a transport ban. Many different transmission routes may play a role, and by combining all these small routes into one transmission kernel, a valuable tool for analysis of transmission under control conditions is created. Unfortunately, data was only available on the density of flocks in the outbreak area for only 33 of the 345 outbreaks. This number is insufficient for a robust estimation of a transmission kernel, and it certainly does not allow for distinction between strains, types and species. However, it still has value for evaluating the suitability of existing kernel estimates for extrapolation to other countries, other virus strains and other host species. We found that these data indicate that the two available transmission kernels show higher transmission than fits with the many outbreaks in this dataset. We find that the transmission could easily be 5 times lower than the lower kernel estimate from the Netherlands, whereas the other available kernel, (from Italy) shows 5 times higher transmission than the Dutch kernel. Thus, using the Dutch kernel with an uncertainty of a factor 5, is a good indication of the potential transmission range between flocks of incoming new HPAI viruses.