Risk, Partner Selection and Contractual Control in Interfirm Relationships

Ding, Rong; Dekker, Henri C.; Groot, T.L.C.M.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2175083

Cited by 34 publications

(75 citation statements)

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“…First, data were only collected from one party of an inter‐organisational relationship. Even though there is evidence supporting the validity of a study of one party's experience in inter‐organisational collaboration (Geringer and Hebert, ; Kumar et al ., ; Ding et al ., ), richer insights could be gained if future research investigates MCS, justice and performance by using evidence from both parties in a relationship. Second, the majority of the respondents in this study were inter‐organisational relationships formed by medium‐sized entities.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In particular, the use of effective ex‐post MCS is essential given the incompleteness of ex‐ante MCS . The association between specific controls and IOR performance has been investigated in management and organisation studies especially in the context of international joint ventures (IJVs) (Yan and Gray, , ; Aulakh et al ., ; Choi and Beamish, ), but only marginally in the accounting literature (Ding et al ., ). Overall, the management and organisation studies found that there was an association between the use of controls and satisfaction with IJV performance.…”

Section: Literature Review and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Studies in management accounting and management indicate that management control systems (MCS) offer means to help realise successful IORs (Das and Teng, ; Spagnolo, ; Free, ; Ding et al ., ). MCS address risks from incomplete contracting (Dekker, ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…In addition, Ding et al . () observed that there are few studies that examine the link between the use of MCS and performance in an IOR context.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Management controls and their links with fairness and performance in inter‐organisational relationships

Wang

Dyball

2018

Accounting & Finance

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This study seeks to contribute to inter-organisational management control literature by examining the impact of the use of management controls on fairness and performance. Findings from a survey of 232 Australian interorganisational relationships reveal that the use of social controls could improve procedural, distributive and interactional fairness. In turn, distributive and interactional fairness could lead to high levels of perceived relational performance. Additional analyses also confirm that formal and social controls are used as complements in managing inter-organisational relationships. 4 The two dimensions of informational and interpersonal justice are separately studied in the social psychology and management literatures (e.g. Colquitt, 2001), although most studies of inter-organisational contexts including this study, operationalise them as a single dimension, that is, as interactional fairness (e.g. Luo, 2007).

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Review and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…In addition, Ding et al . () observed that there are few studies that examine the link between the use of MCS and performance in an IOR context.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Management controls and their links with fairness and performance in inter‐organisational relationships

Wang

Dyball

2018

Accounting & Finance

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“…Most studies find a positive association between risks to inter-firm exchange and the use of formal controls. For example, Burkert, Ivens & Shan (2012) find that in more complex settings, formal controls are used more intensively, while Ding, Dekker and Groot (2013) establish that, as risks increase in the transaction context, firms place more emphasis on developing more complex (inclusive and specific) contracts to manage the collaboration.…”

Section: Formal Contractsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Relational contracting and the myth of trust: Control in a co-opetitive setting

Grafton

Mundy

2017

Management Accounting Research

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In this paper, we investigate the role of formal and relational contracts in managing alliance risks that arise in co-opetitive collaborations. We undertake a case study of a co-opetitive sales alliance within the independent publishing sector, incorporating data from all firms to the alliance. We provide empirical evidence of the relational risks of misappropriation and opportunism as manifest in both vertical (buyer-supplier) and horizontal activities within the alliance and identify a further relational risk relating to concerns of introducing homogeneity into the product offerings of firms. We also examine the nature of compliance and regulatory risk, which is salient in this setting given the potential for anti-competitive behaviour towards customers and suppliers. We find that the firms mitigate alliance risks primarily through the use of relational contracts (informal self-enforcing agreements). Formal contracts are evident in the buyer-supplier relationship, but are used mainly for ex post co-ordination. We adopt an organisational economics perspective to explain the specific mechanisms that support

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Accounting Standard-Setting for an Emission Trading Scheme: The Korean Case

2022

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This study examines the participation and interaction of relevant individuals in the process of developing an accounting standard for South Korea’s emission trading scheme (ETS). Despite the enormous accounting implications of such schemes, there is a paucity of research on the development and application of ETS accounting. Ulrich Beck’s and Anthony Giddens’s risk society framework is utilised to scrutinise the process of setting accounting standards—from the agenda-setting stage all the way to the final publication of the standard. In this case study, we take an interpretive approach in analysing the rich data collected through face-to-face interviews with prominent standard-setters, accounting experts and representatives of industry and government. Participant observation and relevant documents were also considered. The findings highlight the political nature of accounting standard-setting and identify the risks and responsibilities of the key agents in the process along with the means of sub-political action taken to influence decisions. We reveal that the agents involved in standard-setting attempted to balance their anthropocentric priorities with ecocentric responsibilities and prioritised the production of a standard with minimal impact on economic, reputational, and operational risk. Having authority as a standard-setter, referring frequently to precedents and, perhaps most importantly, engaging actively with the stakeholders throughout the process seem to have contributed to a widely accepted standard, which can serve as a benchmark for future attempts to factor in ETSs.

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Risk, Partner Selection and Contractual Control in Interfirm Relationships

Cited by 34 publications

References 0 publications

Management controls and their links with fairness and performance in inter‐organisational relationships

Management controls and their links with fairness and performance in inter‐organisational relationships

Relational contracting and the myth of trust: Control in a co-opetitive setting

Accounting Standard-Setting for an Emission Trading Scheme: The Korean Case

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