Group Polarization refers to the tendency of groups to make more extreme decisions than individuals. In decision problems under incomplete information, individuals make decisions based on their private information while groups gather the information of their members. As a result, groups are typically better informed than individuals. This paper sees group polarization as an outcome of the difference in access to information. We consider two decision makers, a group and an individual, facing a monotone decision problem. They share similar preferences and prior belief but the group is better informed than the individual in the sense the monotone information order (Athey and Levin, 2001). This paper presents sufficient conditions under which the group's decisions polarize as compared to the individual's. Group polarization is considered from two points of view: ex ante, the group's decisions are more dispersed in the sense of second order stochastic dominance if optimal actions are a linear function of beliefs. Conditional on a particular state, the group's actions are more extreme (in a stochastic sense) if optimal actions are linear in beliefs and the group has more information conditional on that state. * Paris School of Economics-University of Paris 1 † University of California, San Diego 1 We present natural environments where the linearity condition fails and in which group polarization does not fully occur. We relate our results to existing experimental evidence. Journal of Economic Literature Classifica-