Robust processes and teleological language

Abstract

I consider some hitherto unexplored examples of teleological language in the sciences. In explicating these examples, I aim to show (a) that such language is not the sole preserve of the biological sciences, and (b) that not all such talk is reducible to the ascription of functions. In chemistry and biochemistry, scientists explaining molecular rearrangements and protein folding talk informally of molecules rearranging "in order to" maximize stability. Evolutionary biologists, meanwhile, often speak of traits evolving "in order to" optimize some fitness-relevant variable. I argue that in all three contexts such locutions are best interpreted as shorthands for more detailed explanations which, were we to spell them out in full, would show that the relevant process would robustly converge on the same end-point despite variation in initial conditions. This suggests that, in biology, such talk presupposes a strong form of adaptationism. The upshot is that such shorthands may be more applicable in the physical sciences than the biological.

The Ontology of Organismic Agency: A Kantian Approach

“…Nonetheless,a gential and functional explanations can interact in subtle ways.F or instance,acase could be made that philosophical accounts of functional explanations often presuppose it is possiblet oa scribe purposes to the  Some of the most frequentlyu sed variablesi nclude potential energy,e ntropy,f ree energy, fitness,utility.  See also Birch (2012) for acompatible accountofwhathecalls 'agent-talk' in terms of robustness and stable states. whole organism.…”