Robustness of secret key agreement protocol with massive MIMO under pilot contamination attack

Im, Sanghun; Jeon, Haemin; Choi, Jinho; Ha, Jeongseok

doi:10.1109/ictc.2013.6675552

Cited by 8 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…As a performance benchmark, we also plot the upper bound onP out (w k , δ) by introducing another upper bound on the Marcum Q-function: (28): where erfc(x) = 1 π ∞ x exp −t 2 dt. Note that although the bound in (35) is less insightful than that in (30), it provides a tighter upper bound than that in (30) [51], [52]. Fig.…”

Section: B Average Secrecy Outage Probabilitymentioning

confidence: 92%

“…Meanwhile, the work in [34] proposed a PCA detection technique which employs random pilots from a set of phaseshift keying symbols. In [35], an SKA protocol under potential PCA was proposed and evaluated. However, the SKA protocol in [35] is inefficient in the sense that the protocol requires multiple coherence blocks and simply discards suspicious packets.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In [35], an SKA protocol under potential PCA was proposed and evaluated. However, the SKA protocol in [35] is inefficient in the sense that the protocol requires multiple coherence blocks and simply discards suspicious packets.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Secret Key Agreement With Large Antenna Arrays Under the Pilot Contamination Attack

Jeon

Choi

et al. 2015

IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun.

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Abstract-We present a secret key agreement (SKA) protocol for a multi-user time-division duplex system where a base-station (BS) with a large antenna array (LAA) shares secret keys with users in the presence of non-colluding eavesdroppers. In the system, when the BS transmits random sequences to legitimate users for sharing common randomness, the eavesdroppers can attempt the pilot contamination attack (PCA) in which each of eavesdroppers transmits its target user's training sequence in hopes of acquiring possible information leak by steering beam towards the eavesdropper. We show that there exists a crucial complementary relation between the received signal strengths at the eavesdropper and its target user. This relation tells us that the eavesdropper inevitably leaves a trace that enables us to devise a way of measuring the amount of information leakage to the eavesdropper even if PCA parameters are unknown. To this end, we derive an estimator for the channel gain from the BS to the eavesdropper and propose a rate-adaptation scheme for adjusting the length of secret key under the PCA. Extensive analysis and evaluations are carried out under various setups, which show that the proposed scheme adequately takes advantage of the LAA to establish the secret keys under the PCA.

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Section: B Average Secrecy Outage Probabilitymentioning

confidence: 92%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Secret Key Agreement With Large Antenna Arrays Under the Pilot Contamination Attack

Jeon

Choi

et al. 2015

IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun.

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“…When the number of antennas at the BS is large, it is impractical to estimate the downlink CSI at the user terminal side. Besides, eavesdroppers may utilize the pilot contamination attack [ 43 ], where the eavesdropper transmits the same pilot signals as the legitimate user. Then, the BS obtains the summation of the channel legitimate user and that of the eavesdropper, impacting the reciprocity of the channel observations of the BS and user terminals.…”

Section: Crkg In Massive Mimo and Mmwave Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Then, the BS and user terminals can estimate their effective channel matrices with low dimensions, containing the dominant channel path information. For the pilot contamination attack, there exists a crucial complementary relation between the received signal strengths at the eavesdropper and the legitimate user [ 43 ]. This relation can measure the amount of information leakage to the eavesdropper and a rate-adaptation scheme is proposed.…”

Section: Crkg In Massive Mimo and Mmwave Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Physical Layer Key Generation in 5G and Beyond Wireless Communications: Challenges and Opportunities

Sun

Zhang

et al. 2019

Entropy

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The fifth generation (5G) and beyond wireless communications will transform many exciting applications and trigger massive data connections with private, confidential, and sensitive information. The security of wireless communications is conventionally established by cryptographic schemes and protocols in which the secret key distribution is one of the essential primitives. However, traditional cryptography-based key distribution protocols might be challenged in the 5G and beyond communications because of special features such as device-to-device and heterogeneous communications, and ultra-low latency requirements. Channel reciprocity-based key generation (CRKG) is an emerging physical layer-based technique to establish secret keys between devices. This article reviews CRKG when the 5G and beyond networks employ three candidate technologies: duplex modes, massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) and mmWave communications. We identify the opportunities and challenges for CRKG and provide corresponding solutions. To further demonstrate the feasibility of CRKG in practical communication systems, we overview existing prototypes with different IoT protocols and examine their performance in real-world environments. This article shows the feasibility and promising performances of CRKG with the potential to be commercialized.

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Securing NextG networks with physical-layer key generation: A survey

Xiao¹,

Zhao²,

Feng³

et al. 2023

Security and Safety

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As the development of next-generation (NextG) communication networks continues, tremendous devices are accessing the network and the amount of information is exploding. However, with the increase of sensitive data that requires confidentiality to be transmitted and stored in the network, wireless network security risks are further amplified. Physical-layer key generation (PKG) has received extensive attention in security research due to its solid information-theoretic security proof, ease of implementation, and low cost. Nevertheless, the applications of PKG in the NextG networks are still in the preliminary exploration stage. Therefore, we survey existing research and discuss (1) the performance advantages of PKG compared to cryptography schemes, (2) the principles and processes of PKG, as well as research progresses in previous network environments, and (3) new application scenarios and development potential for PKG in NextG communication networks, particularly analyzing the effect and prospects of PKG in massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO), reconfigurable intelligent surfaces (RISs), artificial intelligence (AI) enabled networks, integrated space-air-ground network, and quantum communication. Moreover, we summarize open issues and provide new insights into the development trends of PKG in NextG networks.

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Robustness of secret key agreement protocol with massive MIMO under pilot contamination attack

Cited by 8 publications

References 13 publications

Secret Key Agreement With Large Antenna Arrays Under the Pilot Contamination Attack

Secret Key Agreement With Large Antenna Arrays Under the Pilot Contamination Attack

Physical Layer Key Generation in 5G and Beyond Wireless Communications: Challenges and Opportunities

Securing NextG networks with physical-layer key generation: A survey

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