This article outlines a classroom simulation for teaching the bargaining model of war. This model has become one of the most important theories of international confl ict, but the technical notation often used to illustrate it is troublesome for some students. I describe a simple card game that can be integrated into a broader strategy for conveying the bargaining model's core insights. I also highlight ways in which the game can be modifi ed to focus on diff erent aspects of the model's logic. J ames Fearon's seminal work on the "bargaining model" of war set in motion a research agenda that highlights the important effects of informational asymmetries on international confl ict (Fearon 1995 ). The basic claim that uncertainty, misrepresentation, and mutual optimism can substantially increase the likelihood of confl ict has gained significant traction in the field. Indeed, it is reasonable to claim that the bargaining model should constitute an important component of an undergraduate international relations (IR) curriculum. Despite the model's elegance and intuitive logic, however, much of the bargaining literature contains highly technical, game-theoretic notation that is simply unsuited for most undergraduate students. 1 Even basic treatments in widely used introductory textbooks use basic mathematical notation that might be problematic for certain students (Frieden, Lake, and Schultz 2012 ).This article describes a simple card game that clearly illustrates the core logic of Fearon's bargaining model. The game carefully simulates informational asymmetries and costly confl ict while providing students with "incentives to misrepresent" their bargaining strength, as Fearon's model indicates. The game is highly fl exible, and the parameters can be adjusted easily to highlight diff erent components of the bargaining logic.Research has shown that classroom simulations can be a highly eff ective pedagogical tool (Frederking 2005 ;Shellman and Turan 2006 ). As such, the lack of simulations for teaching this important theory is highly problematic. The simulation described here is somewhat atypical in that it is divorced from real-world political scenarios (Brynen 2010 ; Wheeler 2006 ). I do not present a "role-playing" game or a hypothetical crisis situation. Rather, I describe a game that focuses entirely on the abstract logic of information, bargaining, and confl ict. Instructors then can integrate this game with additional simulations that encourage students to apply the bargaining logic to real-world scenarios (Asal 2005 ; Brynen 2010 ). For instance, instructors might follow this game with an in-depth historical case study of the Korean War or a crisis simulation centered on the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir. By integrating this game into a broader lesson plan, instructors can incorporate the bargaining model into even introductory IR courses.
DESCRIBING THE BARGAINING MODELFearon's argument centers on the idea that war is costly and that if rational states were completely informed regarding the capa...