Roles of mutation rate and co-existence of multiple strategy updating rules in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games

Takesue, Hirofumi

doi:10.1209/0295-5075/126/58001

Cited by 22 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 75 publications

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“…Before we proceed, we should note that the men-tioned non-transitive relation between competing partners may emerge in other types of evolutionary game models, too [24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32]. For instance, by introducing voluntary participation into the classic public goods game we can observe an RSP -type cycle among cooperators, defectors, and loners [33].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategy dependent learning activity in cyclic dominant systems

Szolnoki¹,

Chen²

2020

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals

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The prototype of a cyclic dominant system is the so-called rock-scissors-paper game, but similar relation among competing strategies can be identified in several other models of evolutionary game theory. In this work we assume that a specific strategy from the available set is reluctant to adopt alternative states, hence the related learning activity is reduced no matter which other strategy is considered for adoption. Paradoxically, this modification of the basic model will primarily elevate the stationary fraction of another strategy who is the virtual predator of the one with reduced learning activity. This general reaction of the studied systems is in agreement with our understanding about Lotka-Volterra type cyclic dominant systems where lowering the invasion rate between a source and target species promotes the growth of former population. The observed effect is highly non-linear because the effective invasion rates between strategies may depend sensitively on the details of the actual model.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategy dependent learning activity in cyclic dominant systems

Szolnoki¹,

Chen²

2020

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals

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“…Here we consider the usual imitative rule [51], the Ising (or Glauber dynamics) rule [68], and the dynamic win-stay-loseshift (WSLS) rule [69]. This is done so we can study the robustness of the effects created by payoff perturbation, since previous works have extensively shown how the update rules can lead to different behaviors [22,34,35,47,70,71].…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In EGT, heterogeneity can be related to different aspects of a game, e.g., incentives, interaction topology, learning rates, and dynamics. Previous investigations, such as [22,29,[33][34][35][36][37][38], showed that heterogeneity can support cooperative behaviors in many competitive scenarios. At the same time, other studies such as [39] reported that heterogeneous networks do not promote cooperation when humans play the prisoner's dilemma.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategy equilibrium in dilemma games with off-diagonal payoff perturbations

Amaral

Javarone

2020

Phys. Rev. E

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We analyze the strategy equilibrium of dilemma games considering a payoff matrix affected by small and random perturbations on the off-diagonal. Notably, a recent work [Proc. R. Soc. A 476, 20200116 (2020)] reported that while cooperation is sustained by perturbations acting on the main diagonal, a less clear scenario emerges when perturbations act on the off-diagonal. Thus, the second case represents the core of this investigation, aimed at completing the description of the effects that payoff perturbations have on the dynamics of evolutionary games. Our results, achieved by analyzing the proposed model under a variety of configurations as different update rules, suggest that off-diagonal perturbations actually constitute a nontrivial form of noise. In particular, the most interesting effects are detected near the phase transition, as perturbations tend to move the strategy distribution towards nonordered states of equilibrium, supporting cooperation when defection is pervading the population, and supporting defection in the opposite case. To conclude, we identified a form of noise that, under controlled conditions, could be used to enhance cooperation and greatly delay its extinction.

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“…Individual migration is an essential characteristic of living organisms [22]. It has been demonstrated that the mode of individual mobility does influence the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation among unrelated individuals, which has attracted intensive research activity in recent years [23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33][34][35][36][37][38][39]. Theoretical and experimental studies have shown that individual mobility can promote the evolution of cooperation [40][41][42][43][44][45][46][47][48][49][50][51][52][53][54][55][56][57][58][59].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Leaving bads provides better outcome than approaching goods in a social dilemma

2020

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Individual migration has been regarded as an important factor for the evolution of cooperation in mobile populations. Motivations of migration, however, can be largely divergent: one is highly frustrated by the vicinity of an exploiter or defector, while other enthusiastically searches cooperator mates. Albeit both extreme attitudes are observed in human behavior, but their specific impacts on wellbeing remained unexplored. In this work, we propose an orientation-driven migration approach for mobile individuals in combination with the mentioned migration preferences and study their roles in the cooperation level in a two-dimensional public goods game. We find that cooperation can be greatly promoted when individuals are more inclined to escape away from their defective neighbors. On the contrary, cooperation cannot be effectively maintained when individuals are more motivated to approach their cooperative neighbors. In addition, compared with random migration, movement by leaving defectors can promote cooperation more effectively. By means of theoretical analysis and numerical calculations, we further find that when individuals only choose to escape away from their defective neighbors, the average distance between cooperators and defectors can be enlarged, hence the natural invasion of defection can be efficiently blocked. Our work, thus, provides further insight on how different migration preferences influence the evolution of cooperation in the unified framework of spatially social games. such mode of migration leads to the outbreak of cooperation. On the other hand, Chen et al proposed riskdriven migration in the collective-risk social dilemma game on a square lattice and found that risk-driven migration dramatically enhances the evolution of public cooperation when individuals move away from unfavorable locations [41].It is worth pointing out that most of previous works consider random migration [28,40], success-driven migration [27], or risk-driven migration [41] separately. They do not consider the orientation-driven migration under which different migration preferences or migration modes are considered in a unified framework. Indeed individuals can adjust their moving orientation according to these preferred modes. By means of migration they can move away from unfavorable environment, pursuit the profitable circumstances, or choose other directions as they wish in realistic situations. However, it is still unclear how such orientation-driven migration influences the evolution of cooperation and which mode of individual migration can promote the evolution of cooperation more effectively.In this work, we thereby propose an orientation-driven migration into a population of mobile individuals playing the public goods game. We assume that individuals can choose the direction of mobility depending on the strategy types of their neighbors on a two-dimensional plane under such orientation-driven migration. Correspondingly, individuals can choose to escape from neighboring defectors or move to neighboring cooperato...

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Roles of mutation rate and co-existence of multiple strategy updating rules in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games

Cited by 22 publications

References 75 publications

Strategy dependent learning activity in cyclic dominant systems

Strategy dependent learning activity in cyclic dominant systems

Strategy equilibrium in dilemma games with off-diagonal payoff perturbations

Leaving bads provides better outcome than approaching goods in a social dilemma

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