2015
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.02.002
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Roth–Postlewaite stability and von Neumann–Morgenstern stability

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Cited by 7 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…For this class of preference profiles, we first show that the core may still be empty; we prove that, by contrast, the set of stable allocations is nonempty and forms a stable set à la von Neumann and Morgenstern. The latter two results rest on the corresponding ones provided by Roth and Postlewaite (1977) and Kawasaki (2015), respectively, for a classical housing market with no externalities.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 71%
See 3 more Smart Citations
“…For this class of preference profiles, we first show that the core may still be empty; we prove that, by contrast, the set of stable allocations is nonempty and forms a stable set à la von Neumann and Morgenstern. The latter two results rest on the corresponding ones provided by Roth and Postlewaite (1977) and Kawasaki (2015), respectively, for a classical housing market with no externalities.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 71%
“…For the reason expressed by Fact 4, stable allocations have been considered a solution concept in its own right as well as a proper refinement to the core. For classical preference relations, relevant positive results have been provided for such solution notion: first, the set of stable allocations is nonempty when no trader is indifferent between any indivisible goods (Roth & Postlewaite, 1977); moreover, when a suitable dominance relation among allocations is considered, stable allocations form a stable set à la von Neumann–Morgenstern (Kawasaki, 2015). Unfortunately, the former property does not hold in general for our model, as shown by the next fact.…”
Section: Motivating Examples and Preparatory Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Ma (1994) proved that the TTC mechanism is the unique mechanism satisfying individual rationality, 11 Pareto efficiency, and strategy-proofness. 12 Furthermore, the strong-core allocation is "stable" under multiple definitions (Roth and Postlewaite (1977), Wako (1984Wako ( , 1991, Kawasaki (2015)). All things considered, the strong-core allocation is this market's most compelling outcome.…”
Section: Private and Public Ownershipmentioning
confidence: 99%