ROYALE: A Framework for Universally Composable Card Games with Financial Rewards and Penalties Enforcement

David, Bernardo; Dowsley, Rafael; Larangeira, Mario

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-32101-7_18

Cited by 10 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…There are several works [15,[18][19][20][21] based on the model with stateful contracts, e.g., Ethereum [22]. This model is stronger than our model since it requires an advanced blockchain techniques beyond Bitcoin.…”

Section: Related Work and The Scope Of This Papermentioning

confidence: 99%

Constant-Round Linear-Broadcast Secure Computation with Penalties

Nakai¹,

Shinagawa²

2022

Preprint

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It is known that Bitcoin enables achieving fairness in secure computation by imposing monetary penalties on adversarial parties. This functionality is called secure computation with penalties. Bentov and Kumaresan (Crypto 2014) introduced the claim-or-refund functionality that can be implemented via Bitcoin. They achieved secure computation with penalties with O(n) rounds and O(n) broadcasts for any function, where n is the number of parties. After that, Kumaresan and Bentov (CCS 2014) showed a constant-round protocol. Unfortunately, this protocol requires O(n 2 ) broadcasts. As far as we know, no protocol achieves O(1) rounds and O(n) broadcasts based on Bitcoin. This work accomplishes such efficiency in secure computation with penalties. We first show a protocol in a slightly relaxed setting called secure computation with non-equivalent penalties. This setting is the same as secure computation with penalties except that every honest party receives more than a predetermined amount of compensation, while the previous one requires that every honest party receives the same amount of compensation. Namely, our setting allows the compensations for honest parties to be non-equivalent. Moreover, we present a technique to remove the non-equivalence of our protocol without sacrificing efficiency. We then propose a new ideal functionality called claim-refund-or-give that can be implemented via Bitcoin.

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Section: Related Work and The Scope Of This Papermentioning

confidence: 99%

Constant-Round Linear-Broadcast Secure Computation with Penalties

Nakai¹,

Shinagawa²

2022

Preprint

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“…The research body includes tweaks towards improving the underlying blockchain protocol in various settings [31,55], game-theoretic studies of pooling behavior [59,13,2], as well as equilibria that involve abstaining from the protocol [32] in high cost scenarios. Going beyond consensus, economic mechanisms have also been considered in the context of multi-party computation [57,20,19], to disincentivize "cheating". Finally, a large body of research was dedicated to optimizing particular attacks; respresentative works i) identify optimal selfish mining strategies [81]; ii) propose a framework [41] for quantitatively evaluating blockchain parameters and identifies optimal strategies for selfish mining and doublespending, taking into account network delays; iii) propose alternative strategies [72], that are more profitable than selfish mining.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Blockchain Nash Dynamics and the Pursuit of Compliance

Karakostas¹,

Kiayias²,

Zacharias³

2022

Preprint

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We study Nash-dynamics in the context of blockchain protocols. Specifically, we introduce a formal model, within which one can assess whether the Nash dynamics can lead utility maximizing participants to defect from "honest" protocol operation, towards variations that exhibit one or more undesirable infractions, such as abstaining from participation and extending conflicting protocol histories. Blockchain protocols that do not lead to such infraction states are said to be compliant. Armed with this model, we study the compliance of various Proof-of-Work (PoW) and Proof-of-Stake (PoS) protocols, with respect to different utility functions and reward schemes, leading to the following results: i) PoS ledgers under resource-proportional rewards can be compliant if costs are negligible, but non-compliant if costs are significant, ii) PoW and PoS under block-proportional rewards exhibit different compliance behavior, depending on the lossiness of the network, iii) considering externalities, such as exchange rate fluctuations, we quantify the benefit of economic penalties in the context of PoS protocols with respect to compliance.

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“…Motivated by this novel setting, several applications have recently emerged that use blockchains (or the cryptocurrencies that build on top of them) as enablers for cryptographic protocols. For example, a number of recent works [1,2,6,27,28] describe how blockchain-based cryptocurrencies can be used to obtain a natural notion of fairness in multi-party computation against dishonest majorities; or to allow parties to play games of chance-e.g., card games like poker-without the need of a trusted third party [15,29]; or how to use blockchains as bulletin boards in electronic voting [30]. Such developments-in conjunction with the direct applicability to cryptocurrencies-have motivated general, formal security analysis of the functionality that blockchain protocols provide, undertaken in steps of successive refinement in [4,18,19,33].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ouroboros Genesis

Badertscher

Gaži²,

Kiayias

et al. 2018

Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

176

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We present a novel Proof-of-Stake (PoS) protocol, Ouroboros Genesis, that enables parties to safely join (or rejoin) the protocol execution using only the genesis block information. Prior to our work, PoS protocols either required parties to obtain a trusted "checkpoint" block upon joining and, furthermore, to be frequently online or required an accurate estimate of the number of online parties to be hardcoded into the protocol logic. This ability of new parties to "bootstrap from genesis" was a hallmark property of the Bitcoin blockchain and was considered an important advantage of PoW-based blockchains over PoS-based blockchains since it facilitates robust operation in a setting with dynamic availability, i.e., the natural setting-without external trusted objects such as checkpoint blocks-where parties come and go arbitrarily, may join at any moment, or remain offline for prolonged periods of time. We prove the security of Ouroboros Genesis against a fully adaptive adversary controlling less than half of the total stake in a partially synchronous network with unknown message delay and unknown, varying levels of party availability. Our security proof is in the Universally Composable setting assuming the most natural abstraction of a hash function, known as the strict Global Random Oracle (ACM-CCS 2014); this highlights an important advantage of PoS blockchains over their PoW counterparts in terms of composability with respect to the hash function formalisation: rather than a strict GRO, PoW-based protocol security requires a "local" random oracle. Finally, proving the security of our construction against an adaptive adversary requires a novel martingale technique that may be of independent interest in the analysis of blockchain protocols.

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ROYALE: A Framework for Universally Composable Card Games with Financial Rewards and Penalties Enforcement

Cited by 10 publications

References 32 publications

Constant-Round Linear-Broadcast Secure Computation with Penalties

Constant-Round Linear-Broadcast Secure Computation with Penalties

Blockchain Nash Dynamics and the Pursuit of Compliance

Ouroboros Genesis

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