Ruling the Ruling Coalition: Information Control and Autocratic Governance

Luo, Zhaotian; Rozenas, Arturas

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2978254

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…Little (2017) and Huang (2015) provide a different rationale for propaganda which is not based on its persuasive effect. More broadly, this paper relates to the literature on information control in autocracies (Egorov et al, 2009;King et al, 2013;Gehlbach and Sonin, 2014;Lorentzen, 2014;Guriev and Treisman, 2015;Hollyer et al, 2015;Shadmehr and Bernhardt, 2015;Luo and Rozenas, 2016). Finally, this paper also contributes to the research on persuasive communication in a symmetric information setting (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011).…”

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confidence: 87%

“…Little (2017) and Huang (2015) provide a different rationale for propaganda which is not based on its persuasive effect. More broadly, this paper relates to the literature on information control in autocracies (Egorov et al, 2009;Gehlbach and Sonin, 2014;Guriev and Treisman, 2015;Lorentzen, 2014;Luo and Rozenas, 2016;King et al, 2013;Shadmehr and Bernhardt, 2015;Hollyer et al, 2015).…”

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confidence: 98%

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Propaganda to persuade

2019

PSRM

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I analyze a model in which an incumbent ruler designs a rule for propaganda disclosure that reveals information about her competence to her allies and opponents. A message that increases beliefs about the incumbent's competence is considered as propaganda. I show that for propaganda to be persuasive, it must be limited in frequency. I also demonstrate how various features of the environment affect the frequency of propaganda. Propaganda increases in frequency as the incumbent's allies become more dependent on her and as her opponents become weaker. Further, there is a non-monotonic relationship between the strength of the conflict of interest between both her allies and her opponents and the frequency of propaganda. As conflict increases, the frequency of propaganda decreases up to a threshold beyond which increased conflict is associated with more frequent propaganda.

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confidence: 87%

“…Little (2017) and Huang (2015) provide a different rationale for propaganda which is not based on its persuasive effect. More broadly, this paper relates to the literature on information control in autocracies (Egorov et al, 2009;Gehlbach and Sonin, 2014;Guriev and Treisman, 2015;Lorentzen, 2014;Luo and Rozenas, 2016;King et al, 2013;Shadmehr and Bernhardt, 2015;Hollyer et al, 2015).…”

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confidence: 98%

Propaganda to persuade

2019

PSRM

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“…Autocrats have used information manipulation for centuries, and scholars expect citizens to be suspicious of authoritarian propaganda (Mickiewicz 2008). Thus, theories of propaganda-see, e.g., Gehlbach and Sonin (2014); Luo and Rozenas (2022)-may model it as a form of persuasion, and ask: How do autocrats win over the skeptical public? They may use sophisticated techniques, such as mixing fact with fiction (Stockmann and Gallagher 2011;Gehlbach 2010) or infusing political messages with entertainment (Tolz and Teper 2018), to make their messages more plausible and appealing to moderate citizens.…”

Section: Rulementioning

confidence: 99%

Rethinking Propaganda: How State Media Build Trust Through Belief Affirmation

Shirikov¹

2022

Preprint

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Research on propaganda and censorship often focuses on strategies that autocrats can use to persuade skeptical citizens. I argue that this focus overestimates the role of persuasion in authoritarian rule, and I describe a different strategy that popular autocrats can use—affirmation propaganda—that builds credibility by speaking to citizens' existing views. Affirmation propaganda results in more positive perceptions of propaganda outlets and in skepticism about independent media. I test this argument using three studies in Russia. In two randomized experiments, I demonstrate that pro-regime citizens trust reports from state media more than reports from independent media. Additional survey evidence suggests that regime supporters deny disinformation and censorship by propaganda outlets despite often recognizing the pro-government bias of these outlets. One implication of this analysis is that independent media pose less of a challenge to authoritarian rule than previously thought. I also discuss the limitations of affirmation propaganda.

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A Model of Protests, Revolution, and Information

Barberà

Jackson

2016

SSRN Journal

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A collective action or revolt succeeds only if sufficiently many people participate. We study how potential revolutionaries' ability to coordinate is affected by what they learn from different sources. We first examine how people learn about the likelihood of a revolution's success by talking to those around themselves, which can either work in favor or against the success of an uprising, depending on the prior beliefs of the agents, the homogeneity of preferences in the population, and the number of contacts. We extend the analysis by examining the effects of homophily on learning: people are more likely to meet others who have similar preferences, undercutting learning. We introduce variants of our model to discuss other ways of learning about the support for a revolution. We discuss why holding mass protests before a revolt provides more informative signals of peoples willingness to actively participate than other less costly forms of communication (e.g., via social media). We also show how outcomes of revolutions in one region can inform citizens of another region and thus trigger (or discourage) neighboring revolutions. We also discuss the role of governments in avoiding revolutions and learning about their citizens' concerns; in particular, by observing the strength of protests and counter-protests.

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Ruling the Ruling Coalition: Information Control and Autocratic Governance

Cited by 3 publications

References 42 publications

Propaganda to persuade

Propaganda to persuade

Rethinking Propaganda: How State Media Build Trust Through Belief Affirmation

A Model of Protests, Revolution, and Information

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