Rural Economic Development vs. Tobacco Control? Tensions Underlying the Use of Tobacco Settlement Funds

Abstract

Some public health advocates in tobacco states, having reconsidered the impacts of the federal tobacco price-support program, have negotiated common tobacco regulatory policy stances with tobacco grower representatives. This paper describes the impact of this rapprochement on the state-level negotiations of Master Settlement Agreement funds. It argues that there are indeed two worthy public health goals: tobacco control and the economic viability of tobacco dependent communities (TDCs), but the immediacy of the threat to the latter, the political potency of tobacco growers, and growers' goal of maintaining tobacco as their farms' anchor bring severe risks to the tobacco control portion of Settlement funds. Among three competing philosophies of economic development for TDCs, none are well evaluated, and two potentially create endless demands on Settlement resources. Public health policy advocates are urged to participate in negotiations on TDC economic development and to forcefully advocate for adequate tobacco control resources.

The Master Settlement Agreement and Its Impact on Tobacco Use 10 Years Later

“…Additionally, in tobacco-growing states, there were growing tensions between the goals of tobacco control and rural economic development, with some arguing that zealous efforts to reduce smoking would damage the tobacco industry, and thus rural employment and income. 13,14 In an overview examination of Congressional and state issues, an analyst noted that the MSA "does not address the question of state legislative appropriation of the settlement funds, nor does it earmark or in any way restrict how states spend the funds." 11 Because the MSA did not require the states to spend revenue on any specifi c activities, the way was clear for states to spread MSA revenues through their budgets according to their specifi c political and economic situations.…”

The changing role of agriculture in tobacco control policymaking: A South Carolina case study

“…The US tobacco leaf market was regulated by a federal tobacco price support and quota program, which included a minimum price for US-grown tobacco, acreage allotments for tobacco quota owners and a manufacturer demand-based annual poundage quota, from 1933 through a federal tobacco quota buyout in 2004 (Austin & Altman, 2000; Brown, Rucker, & Thurman, 2007; Grove, 1975; Jones et al, 2008; Sullivan et al, 2009; Zhang & Husten, 1998). The buyout under the 2004 Tobacco Transition Payment Program ended the federal marketing quota and price support program for tobacco and compensated quota holders, effectively freeing tobacco growing from quota system constraints (Markoe, 2004).…”

“…The buyout under the 2004 Tobacco Transition Payment Program ended the federal marketing quota and price support program for tobacco and compensated quota holders, effectively freeing tobacco growing from quota system constraints (Markoe, 2004). This change led to fewer, larger tobacco farms and a sharp rise in the proportion of tobacco grown under direct contracts between individual growers and manufacturers with prices set before production (Austin & Altman, 2000; Beach, Jones, & Tooze, 2008; Boyleston, 2009; Crocker, 2009; Fisher, 2000). …”

“…Recognizing the beginning of the rift between growers and manufacturers, public health groups made coordinated overtures to tobacco growers and agricultural interests, attempting to forge alliances over MSA negotiations, proposed FDA regulation of tobacco and encouraging crop diversification out of tobacco (Austin & Altman, 2000; Jones et al, 2008; Zaccaro & Altman, 2000). These efforts were promoted by President Bill Clinton’s administration (Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, 1998; Kuegel, Myers, Shepherd, Hill, Sroufe, Wheeler et al, 2001; Otanez & Glantz, 2009); the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s “Southern Tobacco Communities Project” (Austin & Altman, 2000; Institute for Environmental Negotiation & University of Virginia, 1997; Jones et al, 2008; Root, 2004); and the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, American Cancer Society and American Heart Association’s False Friends: The US Cigarette Companies’Betrayal of American Tobacco Growers report (Lindblom, 1999).…”

“…These efforts were promoted by President Bill Clinton’s administration (Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, 1998; Kuegel, Myers, Shepherd, Hill, Sroufe, Wheeler et al, 2001; Otanez & Glantz, 2009); the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s “Southern Tobacco Communities Project” (Austin & Altman, 2000; Institute for Environmental Negotiation & University of Virginia, 1997; Jones et al, 2008; Root, 2004); and the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, American Cancer Society and American Heart Association’s False Friends: The US Cigarette Companies’Betrayal of American Tobacco Growers report (Lindblom, 1999). These efforts damaged manufacturers’ credibility as an ally of agricultural interests (Austin & Altman, 2000; Jones et al, 2008). …”