Russia and the overland Belt and Road

Wither the Greater Eurasian Partnership? Challenges from the East in an evolving world order

“…Among EAEU member states, the pattern of trade with China remains unbalanced, with Russia constituting over 80% of this trade followed by Kazakhstan with 10% share (EEC, 2022). The EAEU as a whole, which is one of the cornerstones of GEP for Russia, plays only a peripheral role for China (Koldunova, 2021).…”

“…In 2018, China did not fund any of the roughly 40 projects put forth by EAEU for enhancing cooperation with the BRI (Mankoff, 2022b). There has been considerable confusion regarding which projects constitute this joint format (Koldunova, 2021) and the practical content for further implementation still remains unclear (Novikov, 2021). Experts also anticipate that “institutional differences” between the two projects can prove to be an obstacle, wherein the EEC is oriented toward the trade agreement with China and not the broader project of GEP; which does not prevent EAEU states from engaging with Beijing bilaterally on other issues (Valdai Discussion Club, 2016).…”

“…The two sides are not in an alliance, enabling cooperation on areas of mutual interest while avoiding over‐extension by maintaining neutrality on issues where their core national interests are not involved. It is also possible that the rising divergences in US–China ties brings China closer to Russia (Koldunova, 2021), with both sides converging on their concerns regarding the United States impacting their respective positioning in the international system.…”