Competition for executive-level offices can influence competition for legislative office, and federal institutions can provide an "opportunity structure" that shapes partisan competition. In Brazil, unlike in systems where the presidential election might drive congressional elections, electoral incentives are state-centered. Candidates for Congress focus on the gubernatorial race, not the presidential race. Specifically, the effective number of candidates competing in the gubernatorial race in each state (electoral district) determines the effective number of lists competing in congressional elections in each state in Brazil. In this article, I use OLS regression analysis of electoral data from Brazil's democratic elections to test this proposition. Regression analysis confirms that the effective number of candidates for governor, and not the effective number of candidates for president, drives the effective number of lists competing in the legislative election."If every politician's first rule is to survive, then we reach the following conclusion: it is useless to discuss national issues in the electoral process." -Nelson Jobim, two-term Brazilian federal deputy, former Minister of Justice, and current Supreme Court Justice.
Theliteratureonthepoliticalconsequencesofelectorallawstypicallyfocuseson how national-level variables contribute to the level of party system fractionalization in national legislative elections. 1 However, as Cox (1997) has recently argued, the dependent variable in much of this literature-the number of parties at the national level-results from a two-step process: votes are first aggregated at the constituency level and a degree of fractionalization results in each constituency; then these district-level systems of electoral fragmentation are sewn together more or less successfully into a national party system, with its concomitant degree of national fragmentation.