2014
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2346.12170
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Russian ‘deniable’ intervention in Ukraine: how and why Russia broke the rules

Abstract: The Russian military interventions in Ukraine, which have led to the annexation of the Crimean peninsula and to the entrenchment of separatist enclaves in Donetsk and Luhansk provinces, directly challenge the post‐Cold War European state system. Russia has consistently denied any wrongdoing or illegal military involvement and has presented its policies as a reaction to the repression of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers. This article argues that it is important to examine and contest unfounded Russian legal… Show more

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Cited by 189 publications
(152 citation statements)
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“…1-8. 72 Allison, 2014. 73 NATO, 1949. 74 See, for example, Shlapak and Johnson, 2015. have important ramifications for the relations between the Russian speakers and their governments.…”
Section: Conventional Aggression Supported By Political Subversionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…1-8. 72 Allison, 2014. 73 NATO, 1949. 74 See, for example, Shlapak and Johnson, 2015. have important ramifications for the relations between the Russian speakers and their governments.…”
Section: Conventional Aggression Supported By Political Subversionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…He shifted his view on April 2014, admitting that "Russian servicemen did back the Crimean self-defence forces" and that "Russia created conditions […] for the expression of the will of the people living in Crimea and Sevastopol".15 As for South-East Ukraine, Russia constantly denied that regular forces were involved. By denying and then openly admitting that his previous public statements were not true, President Putin defied a rather widely accepted principle of international diplomacy: statements of top officials concerning major political crises can, at most, be blurry, but never totally and wilfully wrong (Allison, 2014).16 A hybrid war is therefore a non-linear conflict. Russian hybrid warfare blurs the classic war paradigms: Who is behind the armed attacks; how much is the attacker implicated in the armed attacks; and what are the objectives of the offender.…”
Section: The New Russian Hybrid Warfarementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Growing pressures on NCs (for example, Armenia in 2013, the 2014 annexation of Crimea, and the ongoing war in Ukraine) to deter them from further integration with the EU is a new phenomenon for the EU, which it is struggling to react to. Previously, it was integration with NATO that triggered a military backlash from Russia, whereas now, the EU's role has also been securitized in the Russian view (Allison 2014). The contribution by Kataryna Wolczuk (2016) argues that Russia's military and economic coercion has opened unprecedented windows of opportunities for harsh reforms in Ukraine's energy sector.…”
Section: Multiple External Instruments Of Change: Pressured Into Refomentioning
confidence: 99%