Russian Nation-building from Yel'tsin to Medvedev: Ethnic, Civic or Purposefully Ambiguous?

Shevel, Oxana

doi:10.1080/09668136.2011.547693

Cited by 96 publications

(58 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…In fact, Putin appears to be playing on the same conceptual ambiguity that the Kremlin has long used in its nationality policy (Shevel 2011). The larger finding of this section, accordingly, is that the Russian state came to inspire greater pride at the same time as it became more multi-ethnic in Russian eyes, even in light of Putin's Crimea speech.…”

Section: State Identity: Slightly Stronger and Slightly More Inclusivementioning

confidence: 70%

“…But it is often overlooked by analysts that, in practice, the distinction the new russian nationalism 230 is not so clear. Sometimes russkii can include other ethnic groups, too, and the exact meaning of rossiiskii is even more ambiguous, with the state long doing much actually to promote this ambiguity (Shevel 2011). In any case, while the terms russkii and rossiiskii do not cleanly demarcate them, one can speak of two broad strains of Russian nationalism that may be called 'ethnic Russian nationalism' and 'imperial Russian nationalism'.…”

Section: The Role Of Nationalism In Putin's Political Machinementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The breakup of the Soviet Union did not immediately change this. After 1991, the multi-ethnic 'Soviet people' was replaced by an equally complex and multi-faceted 'Russian' (rossiiskii) civic identity intended to encompass everyone residing within the borders of the new state (see, for example, Tolz 2004;Rutland 2010;Shevel 2011). However, as the dust settled and the Soviet overlay started to wear off, a re-appraisal gradually began to take place.…”

Section: Helge Blakkisrudmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The New Russian Nationalism

Kolstø¹,

Blakkisrud²

2016

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Section: State Identity: Slightly Stronger and Slightly More Inclusivementioning

confidence: 70%

Section: The Role Of Nationalism In Putin's Political Machinementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Helge Blakkisrudmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The New Russian Nationalism

Kolstø¹,

Blakkisrud²

2016

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“…They rallied against Russia but their nonviolent resistance did not play a significant role in stopping the peninsula's invasion. The Kremlin has been in a continuous effort to build a new nation in Russia throughout the independence period (Shevel, 2011). The Crimean events have indicated that the process of nation building in Russia is not complete yet.…”

Section: Crimea: History Law Politicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Power, National Unity, and Territorial Integrity: the Cases of Russia's Chechnya and Ukraine's Crimea

Askerov¹,

Matyók²

2015

Eur. j. interdiscip. stud.

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“…The Russia that emerged in 1991 was in many respects an entirely new country: its borders corresponded neither with the ethnic settlement of Russians in the former Soviet space nor with the historic contours of a previous state. The essential ambiguity about Russia's status as a nation and over the character of the state spills over into the country's relations with the rest of the world (Shevel 2011).…”

Section: Russia and The Problem Of Post-cold War International Ordermentioning

confidence: 99%

The cold peace: Russo-Western relations as a mimetic cold war

Sakwa

2013

Cambridge Review of International Affairs

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In 1989-91 the geo-ideological contestation between two blocs was swept away, together with the ideology of civil war and its concomitant Cold War played out on the larger stage. Paradoxically, while the domestic sources of Cold War confrontation have been transcended, its external manifestations remain in the form of a 'legacy' geopolitical contest between the dominant hegemonic power (the United States) and a number of potential rising great powers, of which Russia is one. The post-revolutionary era is thus one of a 'cold peace'. A cold peace is a mimetic Cold War. In other words, while a Cold War accepts the logic of conflict in the international system and between certain protagonists in particular, a cold peace reproduces the behavioural patterns of a Cold War but suppresses acceptance of the logic of behaviour. A cold peace is accompanied by a singular stress on notions of victimhood for some and undigested and bitter victory for others. The perceived victim status of one set of actors provides the seedbed for renewed conflict, while the 'victory' of the others cannot be consolidated in some sort of relatively unchallenged post-conflict order. The 'universalism' of the victors is now challenged by Russia's neo-revisionist policy, including the defence not so much of Westphalian notions of sovereignty but the espousal of an international system with room for multiple systems (the Schmittean pluriverse).The world today faces enormous threats as the organisations and systems established to manage the Cold War order become increasingly dysfunctional in the post-Cold War era, and indeed to some degree these institutions themselves generate a state of affairs that we shall call a 'cold peace'.1 At the heart of the contemporary cold peace are Russo-Western relations, which remain in a no-man's-land in which there is neither the full-scale creation of a new political community nor an openly acknowledged conflictual relationship. If a Cold War is one that the immediate participants fear to fight directly, although ready to engage in any number of proxy wars, a cold peace is a far more fragile system of international order. A cold peace is an unstable geopolitical truce in which the fundamental problems of a post-conflict international order have not been resolved. While a Cold War accepts the logic of competition, a cold peace proceeds on the assumption that problems have been resolved, and this assumption itself becomes the cause of renewed conflict since it seeks to embed a particular hegemonic formation as universally applicable for all. In keeping with the liminal status of Russo-Western 1 I am grateful for the exceptionally detailed and helpful comments of the anonymous reviewers.

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Russian Nation-building from Yel'tsin to Medvedev: Ethnic, Civic or Purposefully Ambiguous?

Cited by 96 publications

References 11 publications

The New Russian Nationalism

The New Russian Nationalism

Power, National Unity, and Territorial Integrity: the Cases of Russia's Chechnya and Ukraine's Crimea

The cold peace: Russo-Western relations as a mimetic cold war

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