Russian Participation in Global Value Chains

Some Insights into the Bilateral Value Chains—The EU and Russia

“…China is Russia's strategic trade partner (for gross exports and imports; and also for trade in value added). Their interrelationship is influenced by the economic interests of both countries as Fojtíková et al (2022) point out. Even Vladimir (2019 stresses that Russia should increase participation in GVC and Sidorova (2018) indicates the necessity to move the GVC for Russia upwards; however, both suggestions will "on hold" considering the current situation.…”

“…While the EU is one of the founders of the WTO (the EEC previously participated in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT) in 1995, Russia became a WTO member state relatively late, in 2012, and Tajoli (2022) highlighted very limited influence of WTO membership on Russian trade and GDP growth (in comparison with China). Fojtíková et al (2022) emphasized that Russia is the largest country in the world, with many mineral resources and materials; as such, the openness of its economy is lower than that of small open economies. Its export is highly focused on five partners: China, the Netherlands, Germany, Belarus and Turkey, while its most important partners in terms of imports are: China, Germany, Belarus, the US and Italy.…”

“…Russia's main energy companies are an important part of European GVCs; however, these interconnections are affected by vulnerabilities. Fojtíková et al (2022) analyzed Russian participation in GVCs in 2009 and 2015, pointing out the dominance of forward linkages and low participation in GVCs. Chernova et al (2018) and Volgina (2018) pointed out that Russia is a specific country because it supplies other countries with energy and minerals as intermediates that other countries use in their production processes.…”