Ryle's Knowing-How, and Knowing How to Act

Hornsby, Jennifer

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389364.003.0003

Cited by 68 publications

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“…I think the falsity of this is as much as we could reasonably hope to prove using regress arguments. (I think I'm here agreeing with Wiggins (2009) andHornsby (2011).) And the considerations behind the regress argument do, I think, show it to be false.…”

Section: 2))mentioning

confidence: 75%

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Intellectual Skill and the Rylean Regress

Weatherson¹

2016

Phil. Quart.

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Section: 2))mentioning

confidence: 75%

“…Although this paper is heavily influenced by Ryle (1945Ryle ( , 1949, and sympathetic interpreters of Ryle such as Jennifer Hornsby (2011), I make no attempt at Ryle exegesis here. I think there's a decent case to be made that Ryle was sympathetic to the position defended here, but I'm going to leave that debate for another day.…”

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confidence: 99%

Intellectual Skill and the Rylean Regress

Weatherson¹

2016

Phil. Quart.

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“…Nor can it be redeemed by pointing to instances of know‐how which do not require ability, for reasons that will shortly become clear (see Snowdon, , for an extended discussion of such cases). More generally, detaching know‐how from ability makes it look as if there is a causal relationship between know‐how and ability which suggests actions ‘as the effects of intellectual operations’, rather than ‘directly displaying qualities of mind’ (Hornsby, , p. 98), an approach which Ryle attacked in his lengthy critique of intellectualism (Ryle, , Chapter 2).…”

Section: Two Senses Of ‘Know How’?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…They do however also treat know‐how statements as a form of embedded question. Hornsby () has, however, argued that the Stanley and Williamson account has serious problems with the concept of a practical mode of presentation.…”

Section: Two Senses Of ‘Know How’?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…But we are also usually interested, when attributing professional know‐how, not in a single performance under test conditions, but in a guarantee that the candidate can perform consistently and under varying conditions (cf. Hornsby, , p. 92), that s/he understands and can explain or justify actions and, very often, that s/he is capable of achieving excellent levels of performance. It is hard to see how the one‐off assessment of behaviours could satisfy these demands.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Assessing Professional Know-How

Winch

2015

Journal of Philosophy of Education

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CHRISTOPHER WINCHThis article considers how professional knowledge should be assessed. It is maintained that the assessment of professional know-how raises distinctive issues from the assessment of know-how more generally. Intellectualist arguments which suggest that someone's giving an account of how to F should suffice for attributing to them knowledge of how to F are set out. The arguments fail to show that there is no necessary distinction between two kinds of know-how, namely the ability to F and knowing that w is a way to F, such that the latter is more fundamental. The consequences of this failure for our understanding of professional assessment are then considered. The issue of the assessment of tacit knowledge is then addressed. It is concluded that there is no context-dependent codifiable or articulable propositional knowledge of how to F which could be substituted for being able to F and that therefore tacit knowledge can only be assessed in performance. The parallel with Gettier cases is reviewed and it is concluded that the provenance of accounts of and justifications for the attribution of know-how are not matters of indifference to its assessment. Finally, the question of evaluability or what Ryle would have called the applicability of intelligence epithets is discussed in relation to its relevance to our procedures for assessing practical knowledge. Once again, it is concluded that excellent performance is necessary to attribute excellence in know-how. However, the ability to give an account of how and why an agent would do something in hypothetical circumstances is also very important for the assessment of professional knowledge.

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Qualifications as Guarantees of Proficiency: Do We Understand Their Role?

Winch

2023

Knowledge and Space

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A professional qualification should be a guarantee of the professional ability of its holder. But how do we know that a qualification is a guarantee given the variegated nature of the successful exercise of professional ability in a wide variety of complex and unique and often unexpected circumstances? One of the problems involved in professional qualification design concerns path dependency in the way in which qualifications are constructed. We tend to design qualifications according to categories that tradition and culture have handed down instead of asking whether they meet the current needs of professions. In this chapter I will suggest that professional curriculum designers be presented with a series of ‘decision points’ so that they are obliged to explicitly consider whether certain attributes need to be included in the qualification. These attributes will need to include far more than ‘skill’. This claim is illustrated with examples from some of the professions associated with low energy construction.

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Ryle's Knowing-How, and Knowing How to Act

Cited by 68 publications

References 0 publications

Intellectual Skill and the Rylean Regress

Intellectual Skill and the Rylean Regress

Assessing Professional Know-How

Qualifications as Guarantees of Proficiency: Do We Understand Their Role?

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