Safe &amp; Sec Case Patterns

Taguchi, Kenji; Souma, Daisuke; Nishihara, Hideaki

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-24249-1_3

Cited by 7 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…Alexander et al (2011) provide a discussion on the differences between safety and security both from theoretical, and practical aspects. Other studies combine security and safety assurance by creating combined arguments or security-informed safety arguments (Taguchi et al 2014;Netkachova and Bloomfield 2016;Cockram and Lautieri 2007;Netkachova et al 2015). We have also seen that some studies use different types of assurance cases to argue for security in Section 4.3.…”

Section: Security Might Differ From Safetymentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Six of these create their own argumentation patterns (Finnegan and McCaffery 2014a, b;He and Johnson 2012;Patu and Yamamoto 2013b;Poreddy and Corns 2011;Xu et al 2017). The remaining four include usage of patterns (Hawkins et al 2015;Tippenhauer et al 2014), a guideline for creating and documenting security case patterns (Weinstock et al 2007), and a catalogue of security and safety case patterns (Taguchi et al 2014). Since we we only considered patterns created and used for SAC, we excluded those studies in which patterns are borrowed from the safety domain, e.g., Calinescu et al (2017).…”

Section: Patternsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…While the created patterns cover an important aspect, namely abstraction, it is not clear how re-usable or generalize-able they are. Some patterns are derived from various security standards, e.g., Finnegan and McCaffery (2014a) and Taguchi et al (2014) (these are usually from the medical domain where security standardization is more mature compared to other security-critical domains), and one from lessons learned from security incidents (He and Johnson 2012), but none is derived from previous applications of SAC in industry. Another observation we made is that the patterns focus heavily on the argumentation part of SAC in contrast to the evidence part.…”

Section: Patternsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Another observation we made is that the patterns focus heavily on the argumentation part of SAC in contrast to the evidence part. Only few studies provided examples of evidence that can be used in a given pattern (Poreddy and Corns 2011;Taguchi et al 2014;Weinstock et al 2007). However, these examples are specific to the context of the studies, and leaves the abstraction to the reader, with the notable exception of the examples provided by Weinstock et al (2007).…”

Section: Patternsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Security assurance cases—state of the art of an emerging approach

2021

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Security Assurance Cases (SAC) are a form of structured argumentation used to reason about the security properties of a system. After the successful adoption of assurance cases for safety, SAC are getting significant traction in recent years, especially in safety-critical industries (e.g., automotive), where there is an increasing pressure to be compliant with several security standards and regulations. Accordingly, research in the field of SAC has flourished in the past decade, with different approaches being investigated. In an effort to systematize this active field of research, we conducted a systematic literature review (SLR) of the existing academic studies on SAC. Our review resulted in an in-depth analysis and comparison of 51 papers. Our results indicate that, while there are numerous papers discussing the importance of SAC and their usage scenarios, the literature is still immature with respect to concrete support for practitioners on how to build and maintain a SAC. More importantly, even though some methodologies are available, their validation and tool support is still lacking.

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Section: Security Might Differ From Safetymentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Patternsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Patternsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Patternsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Security assurance cases—state of the art of an emerging approach

2021

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“…The first paradigm focuses on claims, evidences, and structured arguments which justify how the evidences can satisfy the claims. Techniques in this category include GSN patterns to overcome challenges on how to integrate and harmonize critical issues on safety in addition to security for their systems [17][18][19][20][21]. The second paradigm focuses on building an argument attached to AADL models.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

VERDICT: A Language and Framework for Engineering Cyber Resilient and Safe System

Meng

Larraz

Siu

et al. 2021

Systems

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The ever-increasing complexity of cyber-physical systems is driving the need for assurance of critical infrastructure and embedded systems. However, traditional methods to secure cyber-physical systems—e.g., using cyber best practices, adapting mechanisms from information technology systems, and penetration testing followed by patching—are becoming ineffective. This paper describes, in detail, Verification Evidence and Resilient Design In anticipation of Cybersecurity Threats (VERDICT), a language and framework to address cyber resiliency. When we use the term resiliency, we mean hardening a system such that it anticipates and withstands attacks. VERDICT analyzes a system in the face of cyber threats and recommends design improvements that can be applied early in the system engineering process. This is done in two steps: (1) Analyzing at the system architectural level, with respect to cyber and safety requirements and (2) by analyzing at the component behavioral level, with respect to a set of cyber-resiliency properties. The framework consists of three parts: (1) Model-Based Architectural Analysis and Synthesis (MBAAS); (2) Assurance Case Fragments Generation (ACFG); and (3) Cyber Resiliency Verifier (CRV). The VERDICT language is an Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL) annex for modeling the safety and security aspects of a system’s architecture. MBAAS performs probabilistic analyses, suggests defenses to mitigate attacks, and generates attack-defense trees and fault trees as evidence of resiliency and safety. It can also synthesize optimal defense solutions—with respect to implementation costs. In addition, ACFG assembles MBAAS evidence into goal structuring notation for certification purposes. CRV analyzes behavioral aspects of the system (i.e., the design model)—modeled using the Assume-Guarantee Reasoning Environment (AGREE) annex and checked against cyber resiliency properties using the Kind 2 model checker. When a property is proved or disproved, a minimal set of vital system components responsible for the proof/disproof are identified. CRV also provides rich and localized diagnostics so the user can quickly identify problems and fix the design model. This paper describes the VERDICT language and each part of the framework in detail and includes a case study to demonstrate the effectiveness of VERDICT—in this case, a delivery drone.

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Model‐driven engineering of safety and security software systems: A systematic mapping study and future research directions

Mashkoor

Egyed

Wille

et al. 2022

J Software Evolu Process

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This article presents a systematic mapping study on the model-driven engineering of safety and security concerns in software systems. Combined modeling and development of both safety and security concerns is an emerging field of research as both concerns affect one another in unique ways. Our mapping study provides an overview of the current state of the art in this field. This study carefully selected 143 publications out of 27,259 relevant papers through a rigorous and systematic process. This study then proposes and answers questions such as frequently used methods and tools and development stages where these concerns are typically investigated in application domains. Additionally, we identify the community's preference for publication venues and trends. The discussion on obtained results also features the gained insights and future research directions.

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Safe & Sec Case Patterns

Cited by 7 publications

References 3 publications

Security assurance cases—state of the art of an emerging approach

Security assurance cases—state of the art of an emerging approach

VERDICT: A Language and Framework for Engineering Cyber Resilient and Safe System

Model‐driven engineering of safety and security software systems: A systematic mapping study and future research directions

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