Safety Standards: Chronic Challenges and Emerging Principles

Habli, Ibrahim

doi:10.1002/9781119443070.ch31

Cited by 4 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Such practice is normally documented by the developing/acquiring organisation, and expressed as a lifecycle of processes that are undertaken throughout the product lifecycle. Such an organisation may develop its own practice predicated on the requirements and informative guidance expressed by an Open Standard, as the organisation seeks to demonstrate due diligence based on conformance with an Open Standard (Habli, 2017) by incorporating the Standard's knowledge within its processes (Antonino et al, 2014).…”

Section: A Discussion On Safety Practice As Requiredmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The challenges associated with the creation and maintenance of Standards are well-documented (see Habli (2017) for example), but we offer no a priori hypotheses regarding any contribution made by the use of as-required processes (Von Krogh et al, 2012), but present a process to determine whether and how a standard can contribute to the problem.…”

Section: A Discussion On Safety Practice As Requiredmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Understanding Safety Engineering Practice: Comparing Safety Engineering Practice as Desired, as Required, and as Observed

Osborne,

Hawkins,

Nicholson

et al. 2023

Preprint

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Section: A Discussion On Safety Practice As Requiredmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Discussion On Safety Practice As Requiredmentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding Safety Engineering Practice: Comparing Safety Engineering Practice as Desired, as Required, and as Observed

Osborne,

Hawkins,

Nicholson

et al. 2023

Preprint

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“…Where applicable, we rely on literature surveys conducted in the field to provide an overview of the respective areas. [67] gives an overview of design processes for safety of AI/MLbased components and [59] discuss qualitative processes in relation to safety in general, giving support to the section on qualitative process arguments of Sec. IV-C. For supervisor architectures, we draw upon the results of [79,82].…”

Section: Threats To Validitymentioning

confidence: 91%

“…The effectiveness of a safety or risk analysis technique is not clearly quantified, as discussed in e.g. [59,60], also implicitly suggesting a correlation between the results of the analysis with the availability of experts with appropriate domain knowledge. For a novel system, such as the ADS, it is obviously difficult to gather such a collection of experts.…”

Section: B Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Holistic Perspectives on Safety of Automated Driving Systems - Methods for Provision of Evidence

Gyllenhammar¹,

Campos²,

Törngren³

2022

Preprint

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<p>In recent years, the enormous investments in Automated Driving Systems (ADSs) have distinctly advanced ADS technologies. Despite promises made by several high profile auto-makers, it has however become clear that the challenges involved for deploying ADS have been drastically underestimated. This paper focuses on the challenge of providing sufficient evidence to support the safety claims of ADSs. The provisioning of such evidence clearly relates both to technical maturity of ADS systems (including actual experiences from deploying such systems), and on the development of methodologies for reasoning about ADS safety claims. Contrary to previous generations of automotive systems, common design, development, verification and validation methods for safety critical systems do not suffice to cope with the increased complexity and operational uncertainties of an ADS. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to provide an understanding of existing methods focusing on the development of a safe ADS and, most importantly, identifying the associated challenges and gaps. </p> <p>We present eight challenges, collectively distinguishing ADSs from safety critical systems in general, and discuss the existing methods in the light of these eight challenges. Based on this discussion, a set of research gaps are identified.</p>

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“…The allocation of SILs to mitigate the effects of hazards or component failures may impact on the system development costs , since achieving a given SIL demands addressing objectives , by performing system engineering activities for producing a set of development artefacts established in the targeted standard/consideration to achieve safety approval according to the level of integrity . The assignment of standard‐related objectives to be addressed, activities to be performed, and artefacts to be produced to achieve a given level of integrity (certification level) may change from one domain‐specific standard to another …”

Section: Dependable‐sple Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Variability management in safety‐critical systems design and dependability analysis

Oliveira

Braga

Masiero

et al. 2019

J Software Evolu Process

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Safety-critical systems are of paramount importance for many application domains, where safety properties are a key driver to engineer critical aspects and avoid system failures. For the benefits of large-scale reuse, software product lines (SPL) have been adopted in critical systems industry.However, the integration of safety analysis in the SPL development process is nontrivial. Also, the different usage contexts of safety-critical systems complicates component fault modeling tasks and the identification of potential hazards. In this light, better methods become necessary to estimate the impact of dependability properties during Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment.Existing methods incorporating the analysis of safety properties in SPL are limited as they do not include hazard analysis and component fault modeling. In this paper, we present the novel DEPendable Software Product Line Engineering (DEPendable-SPLE) approach, which extends traditional SPL processes to support the reuse of safety assets. We also present a detailed analysis of the impact of product and context features on the SPL design, safety analysis, and safety requirements. We applied DEPendable-SPLE to a realistic case study from the aerospace domain to illustrate how to model and reuse safety properties. DEPendable-SPLE reduced the effort of safety analysis for certifying system variants.

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Safety Standards: Chronic Challenges and Emerging Principles

Cited by 4 publications

References 14 publications

Understanding Safety Engineering Practice: Comparing Safety Engineering Practice as Desired, as Required, and as Observed

Understanding Safety Engineering Practice: Comparing Safety Engineering Practice as Desired, as Required, and as Observed

Holistic Perspectives on Safety of Automated Driving Systems - Methods for Provision of Evidence

Variability management in safety‐critical systems design and dependability analysis

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