Sanctions with Chinese characteristics : the effects of China's sanctions rhetoric on its behaviour

Abstract

List of Tables xiii List of Figures xiv List of Abbreviations xvChapter 1 Introduction: The Puzzle of Chinese Sanctions CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION: THE PUZZLE OF CHINESE SANCTIONS 1.1shifted, this 'new assertiveness meme has "gone viral" in the US media, the blogosphere, and in scholarly work '. 4 Despite heightened tensions between China and many other states over a wide range of issues, however, as well as the increasingly aggressive presence of Chinese maritime forces in disputed waters of the East and South China Seas, it remains unclear as to whether China has employed coercive economic measures against countries with which it has had political and territorial disputes. 5 Regardless of political tensions, China's bilateral trade accounts with most of these countries have continued to expand.Beijing also appears reluctant to resort to the use of sanctions at the UNSC. The use of UN sanctions as a political tool to manage challenges to international peace and security began to proliferate in the 1990s. While China, as a permanent member of the UNSC, has rarely wielded its veto to quash UN sanctions, it has remained cautious and sceptical about such sanctions. Chinese representatives to the UNSC have frequently abstained from voting on sanctions-related resolutions, and have repeatedly attempted to dilute various UN sanctions resolutions in order to reduce the effects of sanctions on target

China and the WTO

“…In this period, China at least once employed export restrictions as an instrument of economic coercion, when it targeted Japan in 2010 after the accident in the disputed waters near the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands in the East China Sea (Bradsher, 2010;Tabuchi, 2010;Poh, 2021).…”

“…China has traditionally generated strong headwinds against economic coercion in the form of unilateral economic sanctions (non-UN sanctions). 5 In particular, it opposes the recognition of unilateral economic sanctions' legality in international law (Hofer, 2017;Poh, 2021).…”

“…Although this position may rest on shaky legal ground -international law scholars refuse to acknowledge the existence of the right to be free from economic coercion (Tzanakopoulos, 2015), China's vehement opposition to unilateral sanctions is reflected in its persistent anti-sanctions rhetoric, which depicts Western sanctions as imperialist and interventionist (Poh, 2021). According to some commentators, this rhetoric has a constraining effect on China's use of unilateral economic coercion (Poh, 2021).…”

“…Distinctive features that characterize Chinese unilateral sanctions are their unofficial and undocumented application as well as their narrow scope that is, only specific sectors were targeted, while the existing trade and investment patterns were preserved (Poh, 2021). Scholars also point out China's ability to deftly combine instruments of economic coercion with economic inducements and diplomatic negotiations (Harrell et al, 2018).…”

“…The literature on China's use of unilateral economic sanctions highlights their signaling function (Poh, 2021). This signaling function is of a dualistic nature: it sends a signal to sanctioned states and other states (Blackwill & Harris, 2016;Poh, 2021), as well as to domestic audiences, thus serving domestic political purposes (Harrell et al, 2018).…”