Scan based side channel attack on dedicated hardware implementations of Data Encryption Standard

Scan-Based Side-Channel Attack on the RSA Cryptosystem

“…A scan path model is shown The purpose of a scan-based attack against RSA is to retrieve a secret exponent d from scanned data in an RSA circuit. Scan-based attack here requires several assumptions as in the previous researches in (Nara et al, 2009;2011;Yang et al, 2004;, which are summarized as shown below:…”

“…Yang et al first showed a scan-based side-channel attack against DES in 2004 and retrieved a secret key in DES (Yang et al, 2004). They also proposed a scan-based side-channel attack against AES in (Yang et al, 2006.…”

Security challenges during VLSI test

“…In [1], Yang et al present a new side-channel attack against the Data Encryption Standard (DES), exploiting the observability provided by the scan chain mechanism. They show the same kind of attack against the AES (Advanced Encryption Standard).…”

“…Securing the test protocol, as seen in [1] and [3], has the advantage that even if one bypasses the authentication and uses the test features as a test engineer, no confidential data will be outputted. If data scrambling or pattern watermarking are implemented without protocol security, an attacker who gets the authentication will furnish the correct authentication to disable the scrambling or the watermarking and will then be able to unload confidential data.…”

“…Test protocol security is easy to integrate into the IC development process and can be done during the SoC integration without IP core modification [1], [3], [9]. In terms of test operation, there is little impact (no more test data) except that the test setup may be a longer.…”