Science, Realism and Correlationism. A Phenomenological Critique of Meillassoux' Argument from Ancestrality

Abstract

Quentin Meillassoux has recently launched a sweeping attack against ‘correlationism’. Correlationism is an umbrella term for any philosophical system that is based on ‘the idea [that] we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other’ (Meillassoux 2012: 5). Thus construed, Meillassoux' critique is indeed a sweeping one: It comprises major parts of the philosophical tradition since Kant, both in its more continental and in its more analytical outlooks. In light of this critique, the aim of this paper is twofold: On the one hand, I shall defend phenomenology against Meillassoux' main argument, the ‘argument from ancestrality’. On the other hand, I will argue that this argument, albeit unsuccessful in its original form, can be modified to pose a more serious threat. Although this modified version can also be circumvented, it forces phenomenologists to clarify their stance towards the natural sciences.

Mechanics Lost: Husserl’s Galileo and Ihde’s Telescope

“…According to these principles, all inferential practices and all assertions about the empirical world refer back to the direct, intuitive givenness of the things, processes and states of affairs about which something is asserted (Wiltsche 2012(Wiltsche , 2016. However, it is characteristic for the Crisis that Husserl chooses a different, less abstract path towards this conclusion.…”

Paradox of the Arche-fossil

“…Well, that is going to depend on which variety of Correlationism one considers, on how Φ is construed and understood. For example, Wiltsche (2017) has provided the answer on behalf of Husserlian Phenomenology (by curiously injecting it with a constructive-empiricist serum). Let us sketch, for the sake of concreteness, answer to Q on behalf of Kant's Transcendental Idealism, which we have classified as Strong Type Correlationism (𝛽.2) in Section 1.…”

Perceiving the weird and the wonderful. The mysterious metaphysics of phenomenology, art and science.

“…Lest this seem an extreme argument, note that it is inherent in continental philosophy that thoughts about the ages of suns or planets, fossils or rocks (i.e. about anything in the pre-human past or in the future) are inherently meaningless -because they cannot be related to direct human experience, either in principle or in practice (for discussions of this important point see Meillassoux, 2006;Brassier, 2007;Woodward, 2012;Vrahimis, 2013;Sebold, 2014;Sparrow, 2014;and Wiltsche, 2016). But it is not always appropriate to take a principle to such an extreme, however much that principle may contain a grain of truth, validity or sense within it.…”

“…Continentals have replied to these criticisms, of course, accusing especially Speculative Realism of overstating its case and caricaturing phenomenology (e.g Zahavi, 2016;Lemke, 2017). and defending the place of Realism in phenomenology, or suggesting intermediate positions that combine both Realism and phenomenology (e.g Wiltsche, 2016;. Girardi, 2017;Coate, 2018).…”