Scientific Explanation and Scientific Structuralism

Abstract

Abstract:In this paper we argue that quantum mechanics provides a genuine kind of structural explanations of quantum phenomena. Since structural explanations only rely on the formal properties of the theory, they have the advantage of being independent of interpretative questions. As such, they can be used to claim that, even in the current absence of one agreed-upon interpretation, quantum mechanics is capable of providing satisfactory explanations of physical phenomena. While our proposal clearly cannot be taken to solve all interpretive issues raised by quantum theory, we will argue that it can be successfully applied to some of its most puzzling phenomena, such Heisenberg's uncertainty relations and quantum non-locality. The discussion of these two case studies will also serve to illustrate the main properties of structural explanations and compare them to the DN and the unificationist models. Finally, we briefly discuss how structural explanations might relate to structural realism. §1 IntroductionAn interpretation of the formalism of quantum mechanics that can be regarded as uncontroversial is currently not available. Consequently, philosophers have often contrasted the poor explanatory power of quantum theory to its unparalleled predictive capacity.However, the admission that our best theory of the fundamental constituents of matter cannot explain the phenomena it describes represent a strong argument against the view that explanation is a legitimate aim of science, and this conclusion is regarded by the vast majority of philosophers as unacceptable.On the other hand, it is well-known that for a consistent part of the community of "working physicists" the question of the explanatory power of quantum mechanics does not even arise, and quantum theory is regarded as explicative (or as non-explicative) with respect 2 to quantum phenomena as any other physical theory with respect to its own domain of application.Granting that there is such a chasm between the attitude of the "working physicists" and the philosophers of quantum mechanics, how can we explain it? One possible answer is that physicists are instrumentalists on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, and scientific realists on the rest of the days, depending on the theory they are using. However, rather than attributing physicists such an opportunistic pragmatism, could we not partially make sense of their attitude by hypothesizing that they implicitly use a different criterion for individuating what counts as an "explanation"?In this paper we try to answer in the positive this crucial question by defending the claim that quantum theory provides a kind of mathematical explanation of the physical phenomena it is about. Following the available literature, we will refer to such explanations as structural explanations. In order to illustrate our main claim, we will present two case studies, involving two of the most typical and puzzling quantum phenomena, namely Heisenberg's Uncertainty Relations and quantum non-locality.To the extent that structural explanati...

Diversifying the picture of explanations in biological sciences: ways of combining topology with mechanisms

“…Dorato and Felline (2011) convincingly show that quantum entanglement as well as uncertainty principle are respectively explained by non-communatitivity in Hilbert algebra and by limit properties of Fourier transforms-provided that isomorphisms hold between these mathematical structures and the quantum facts about which we have data. 8 Nevertheless in the special sciences such as biology or social sciences one may resist this view and claim, with the new mechanicists, that mechanisms are the norm of explanations.…”

Mechanisms meet structural explanation

“…The structural account of explanation was originally outlined by R.I. G Hughes (1989a, b) and successively developed by Clifton (2001), Bokulich (2009), Felline (2010 and Dorato and Felline (2011). At a later point ( §4), I will articulate more precisely some of its features.…”

“…As another example of SE, this time from Quantum Theory, Dorato and Felline (2011) Indeed, when they were first noticed by Heisenberg, these relations were considered a phenomenon that required an explanation, but such and explanation (in the mechanistic form that was initially expected) was never provided. Yet the position/momentum Uncertainty Relation is not in general regarded as unexplained in Quantum Theory, but as a perfectly understandable part of Quantum Theory.…”

Non-local common cause explanations for EPR

“…If such explanations are cast in terms of (2), there is no point in claiming that the search for them is rooted in methodological and metaphysical preconceptions that modern physics has outgrown. In particular, the availability of what is known as structural explanations by no means makes the search for causal explanations superfluous (as claimed, e.g., by Dorato and Felline 2011). The interest in causal explanations is to obtain an answer to the question of why a certain variable develops in a certain manner in time -or, in other words, why a certain event occurs at a certain place and time.…”