The aim of this article is to analyze the role of the distinction between principle and constructive theories in the question of the explanatory power of special relativity. We show how the distinction breaks down at the explanatory level. We assess Harvey Brown's claim that, as a principle theory, special relativity lacks explanatory power. We argue that this claim is based on an unrealistic picture of the kind of explanations provided by principle (and constructive) theories. Finally, we argue that the structural account of explanation captures the explanatory success of special relativity.

Abstract:In this paper we argue that quantum mechanics provides a genuine kind of structural explanations of quantum phenomena. Since structural explanations only rely on the formal properties of the theory, they have the advantage of being independent of interpretative questions. As such, they can be used to claim that, even in the current absence of one agreed-upon interpretation, quantum mechanics is capable of providing satisfactory explanations of physical phenomena. While our proposal clearly cannot be taken to solve all interpretive issues raised by quantum theory, we will argue that it can be successfully applied to some of its most puzzling phenomena, such Heisenberg's uncertainty relations and quantum non-locality. The discussion of these two case studies will also serve to illustrate the main properties of structural explanations and compare them to the DN and the unificationist models. Finally, we briefly discuss how structural explanations might relate to structural realism. §1 IntroductionAn interpretation of the formalism of quantum mechanics that can be regarded as uncontroversial is currently not available. Consequently, philosophers have often contrasted the poor explanatory power of quantum theory to its unparalleled predictive capacity.However, the admission that our best theory of the fundamental constituents of matter cannot explain the phenomena it describes represent a strong argument against the view that explanation is a legitimate aim of science, and this conclusion is regarded by the vast majority of philosophers as unacceptable.On the other hand, it is well-known that for a consistent part of the community of "working physicists" the question of the explanatory power of quantum mechanics does not even arise, and quantum theory is regarded as explicative (or as non-explicative) with respect 2 to quantum phenomena as any other physical theory with respect to its own domain of application.Granting that there is such a chasm between the attitude of the "working physicists" and the philosophers of quantum mechanics, how can we explain it? One possible answer is that physicists are instrumentalists on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, and scientific realists on the rest of the days, depending on the theory they are using. However, rather than attributing physicists such an opportunistic pragmatism, could we not partially make sense of their attitude by hypothesizing that they implicitly use a different criterion for individuating what counts as an "explanation"?In this paper we try to answer in the positive this crucial question by defending the claim that quantum theory provides a kind of mathematical explanation of the physical phenomena it is about. Following the available literature, we will refer to such explanations as structural explanations. In order to illustrate our main claim, we will present two case studies, involving two of the most typical and puzzling quantum phenomena, namely Heisenberg's Uncertainty Relations and quantum non-locality.To the extent that structural explanati...

Abstract. This paper investigates the relationship between Structural Explanation and the New Mechanistic account of explanation. The aim of this paper is twofold: firstly, to argue that some phenomena in the domain of fundamental physics, although mechanically brute, are structurally explained; and secondly, by elaborating on the contrast between SE and ME, to better clarify some features of SE. Finally, this paper will argue that, notwithstanding their apparently antithetical character, SE and ME can be reconciled within a unified account of general scientific explanation.

In this paper we argue that structural explanations are an effective way of explaining wellknown relativistic phenomena like length contraction and time dilation, and then try to understand how this can be possible by looking at the literature on scientific models. In particular, we ask whether and how a model like that provided by Minkowski spacetime can be said to represent the physical world, in such a way that it can successfully explain physical phenomena structurally. We conclude by claiming that a partial isomorphic approach to scientific representation can supply an answer only if supplemented by a robust injection of pragmatic factors.In this paper we defend the thesis that structural explanations are an effective way of explaining well-known relativistic phenomena like length contraction and time dilation, and then try to understand how this can be possible by looking at the literature on scientific models. In particular, we ask whether and how Minkowski spacetime's model can be said to represent the physical world, in such a way that it can successfully explain physical phenomena structurally. In the first section, we try to briefly justify the above thesis by providing a brief sketch of structural explanations as they are used in Minkowski spacetime, in contrast to attempts at explaining the relativistic phenomena dynamically (Brown 2005). In the second section we offer a brief survey of the state of the art in the debate between the "representationalist" and the pragmatic conception of models, with particular attention to the inferentialist conception proposed by Suárez (1999Suárez ( , 2003Suárez ( , 2004. In the third section we argue that, in order both to solve some problems within Suárez's inferentialist approach and to account in a consistent way for the use that cognitive agents make of models, it is necessary to assume some kind of partial isomorphism between the mathematical model and the physical target. Our conclusion − the validity of which is here tested only in the specific case of structural explanations in Minkowski spacetime − makes the opposition between 2 the pragmatic and the semantic view look much more apparent than real, and in fact proposes a reconciliation between the two points of view already defended with a different emphasis by Debs and Redhead (2007). Contractions, dilation and structural explanationsSince the publication of Einstein's original paper on special relativity (SR), phenomena like rod contractions and clocks retardations have attracted the attention of philosophers. One of the key questions that has been raised by these phenomena from the very beginning was: are they real?Of course the answer to a question like this depends on what one means by the metaphysically appealing but philosophically treacherous adjective "real" in our context. If "real" means "measurable", then the answer ought to be an uncontroversial "YES" written in capital letters, as every experimental physicist working at Fermi Lab or at the LHC in Geneva could guarantee. If "real" m...

The aim of this paper is to explore the ways in which Axiomatic Reconstructions of Quantum Theory in terms of Information-Theoretic principles (ARQITs) can contribute to explaining and understanding quantum phenomena, as well as to study their explanatory limitations. This is achieved in part by offering an account of the kind of explanation that axiomatic reconstructions of quantum theory provide, and re-evaluating the epistemic status of the program in light of this explanation. As illustrative cases studies, I take Clifton's, Bub's and Halvorson's characterization theorem and Popescu's and Rohrlich's toy models, and their explanatory contribution with respect to quantum non-locality. On the one hand, I argue that ARQITs can aspire to provide genuine explanations of (some aspects of) quantum non-locality. On the other hand, I argue that such explanations cannot rule out a mechanical quantum theory.