Scientific Explanation between Principle and Constructive Theories

Abstract

The aim of this article is to analyze the role of the distinction between principle and constructive theories in the question of the explanatory power of special relativity. We show how the distinction breaks down at the explanatory level. We assess Harvey Brown's claim that, as a principle theory, special relativity lacks explanatory power. We argue that this claim is based on an unrealistic picture of the kind of explanations provided by principle (and constructive) theories. Finally, we argue that the structural account of explanation captures the explanatory success of special relativity.

Physical relativity from a functionalist perspective

“…In particular, the minimal and universal coupling of the matter fields to the metric field means that, in those coordinates (the Fermi Normal Coordinates) in which the metric diagonalises and the connection coefficients vanish, the laws take a simple and universal form, at least to the extent that curvature terms do not appear explicitly in the laws themselves. 11 We shall see in the next section that there is a way of reading this that suggests a kind of functionalism: the metric field is spacetime because of what it does (via the strong equivalence principle) and not by way of what it is. But how might we interpret this kind of claim in a way that is consistent with the relationist themes in the previous section?…”

Minkowski spacetime and Lorentz invariance: The cart and the horse or two sides of a single coin?

“…Rather I take it that explanation is a highly context-dependent notion and that there may even be contexts in which a phenomenological account can provide the best explanation, just as there are others in which a constructive account is called for or where an appeal to a general principle provides the simplest and best explanation" (Frisch 2011, 179-180). 15 Dorato &Felline (2010), andFelline (2011) outline an account of the explanatory power of special relativity that resembles my own. They state that Minkowski structure explains physical phenomena as a mathematical model that is independent of questions about a categorial framework-that is, the model explains independently of ontological assumptions.…”

“…They state that Minkowski structure explains physical phenomena as a mathematical model that is independent of questions about a categorial framework-that is, the model explains independently of ontological assumptions. Now, they assert that special relativity as a theory of principle explains structurally (in terms of models) (Dorato & Felline 2010, 198;Felline 2011, sections 2 and 3). I disagree: special relativity, in its 1905 principle-formulation, explains neither structurally nor chronogeometrically, but its Minkowski-spacetime formulation does.…”

“…Michel Janssen and Harvey Brown have driven it (Janssen 1995(Janssen , 2002a(Janssen , 2002b(Janssen , 2009Balashov and Janssen 2003;Brown 2003Brown , 2005aBrown , 2005bBrown & Pooley 2001, 2006, and it has become a much-discussed issue in the philosophy of physics literature (e.g., Norton 2008, Frisch 2011, Van Camp 2011, Dorato & Felline 2010, Felline 2011. The point in dispute concerns the direction of an alleged arrow of explanation between Minkowski spacetime structure and Lorentz invariance of physical laws: they argue about which is the cart and which is the horse.…”

The Dynamical Approach as Practical Geometry

“…9 Insofar as the two can be decoupled, this essay will focus primarily upon the latter, with an emphasis on the aforementioned ideological claim. Dorato and Felline (2010);Felline (2011);Frisch (2011);Lange (2011);van Camp (2011). Many of these (among others) also focus upon Einstein's claims about the difference in explanatory power of 'principle' and 'constructive' theories.…”