The article deals with the issues of national aggregated ranking (NAR) of higher education institutions. This case is formulated as a collective choice problem. It is proposed to use voting procedures in small groups that meet the Condorcet principle as aggregation method. The paper applies collective choice rules to the problem under consideration. The alternatives final ordering stability obtained from the Board, Copeland, and Kemeny procedures is illustrated by specific examples. The empirical average was considered as Kemeny median approximate estimate. The example showed Board procedure instability to a slight change in the initial ratings obtained in the rating mechanisms under consideration. Using the voting procedures results described in the paper in small groups on a limited sample containing data from fifteen elements group are presented. The constructed three aggregated rankings proximity degree was estimated using two metricsthe Kendall rank correlation coefficient and the Kemeny distance. Based on a comparative results analysis, it can be concluded that it is appropriate to use collective selection procedures that are well-off in Condorcet when constructing aggregated rating of various organizations, including educational institutions.