Scientific Representation

Abstract

This Element presents a philosophical exploration of the notion of scientific representation. It does so by focusing on an important class of scientific representations, namely scientific models. Models are important in the scientific process because scientists can study a model to discover features of reality. But what does it mean for something to represent something else? This is the question discussed in this Element. The authors begin by disentangling different aspects of the problem of representation and then discuss the dominant accounts in the philosophical literature: the resemblance view and inferentialism.They find them both wanting and submit that their own preferred option, the so-called DEKI account, not only eschews the problems that beset these conceptions, but further provides a comprehensive answer to the question of how scientific representation works. This Element is also available in the Open Access on Cambridge Core.

Phenomenology, Perspectivalism and (Quantum) Physics

“…This perspectivalist approach is then applied to the issue of scientific representation, about which a great deal has been written recently (for a brief but useful summary, see [4]). Massimi identifies two forms in this context: 'perspectival 1 ' according to which the representation is situated, specifically in terms of being from a specific vantage point (of the spectator), so that, broadly, the 'scene' is drawn as it appears from there.…”

“…Nevertheless, if we take the second system to be an 'observer' in some generic sense, then the core idea can be expressed as 'different observers can give different accounts of the same set of events' ( [17], p. 1643; see also [18] p. 4), clearly expressing the perspectival character of this interpretation. 4 Consistency between observer is then achieved via the theory itself: any comparison of observations will involve a physical process that will itself be described in quantum mechanical terms and so the internal self-consistency of the theory guarantees that there will be no discrepancy between different observers (see also [19], pp. 403-404).…”

Maps, Models, and Representation

“…7 For a discussion of these models in the context of the DEKI account see, Frigg and Nguyen's (2020), ( 2016), and Nguyen and Frigg's (2022), respectively.…”