Scientific Representation and Theoretical Equivalence

Nguyen, James

doi:10.1086/694003

Cited by 16 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…A similar moral has also been drawn in the vast literature on scientific modeling, where it is now widely recognized that features beyond a mathematical model itself-such as the intentions and natural language glosses of the scientist using the model-are integral to effecting an interpretation of the model. For some helpful overviews of this literature see the works cited in footnote 18 Nguyen (2017). applies this moral about scientific modeling to the debate over theoretical equivalence, supporting the extant critiques mentioned in section 2 (in particular, the critiques ofSklar (1982) andCoffey (2014)).…”

supporting

confidence: 65%

“…The moral in this section is a different route towards the moral emphasized by all extant criticisms of formal criteria. Here I have in mind the investigations of Sklar (1982), Coffey (2014), Nguyen (2017), and Butterfield (2018) (see also Putnam (1983, 38) and van Fraassen ( 2014)). These criticisms rightly point out, from different directions and using different examples, that we can, and often do, use one and the same mathematical object in different ways on different occasions.…”

Section: Trivial Semantic Conventionalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

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What theoretical equivalence could not be

Teitel

2021

Philos Stud

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Formal criteria of theoretical equivalence are mathematical mappings between specific sorts of mathematical objects, notably including those objects used in mathematical physics. Proponents of formal criteria claim that results involving these criteria have implications that extend beyond pure mathematics. For instance, they claim that formal criteria bear on the project of using our best mathematical physics as a guide to what the world is like, and also have deflationary implications for various debates in the metaphysics of physics. In this paper, I investigate whether there is a defensible view according to which formal criteria have significant non-mathematical implications, of these sorts or any other, reaching a chiefly negative verdict. Along the way, I discuss various foundational issues concerning how we use mathematical objects to describe the world when doing physics, and how this practice should inform metaphysics. I diagnose the prominence of formal criteria as stemming from contentious views on these foundational issues, and endeavor to motivate some alternative views in their stead.

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supporting

confidence: 65%

Section: Trivial Semantic Conventionalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

What theoretical equivalence could not be

Teitel

2021

Philos Stud

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“…In other words, much of the work is done by showing that there are alternative formulations of a theory that are, in some suitable sense, empirically equivalent; establishing that the relationship realizing that empirical equivalence is also a categorical equivalence, then, provides a still stronger sense in which the theories should be said to be equivalent. 38 And if the functor is not an equivalence, then one can use the 38 Compare this perspective to classic arguments due to Sklar (1982), recently amplified by, for instance, Coffey (2014), Nguyen (2017), andButterfield (2019), to the effect that a "purely formal" criterion of equivalence could never be adequate. (Recall note 6.)…”

Section: And So Onmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Not Categorical Equivalence?

Weatherall

2021

Hajnal Andréka and István Németi on Unity of Science

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In recent years philosophers of science have explored categorical equivalence as a promising criterion for when two (physical) theories are equivalent. On the one hand, philosophers have presented several examples of theories whose relationships seem to be clarified using these categorical methods. On the other hand, philosophers and logicians have studied the relationships, particularly in the first order case, between categorical equivalence and other notions of equivalence of theories, including definitional equivalence and generalized definitional (aka Morita) equivalence. In this article, I will express some skepticism about this approach, both on technical grounds and conceptual ones. I will argue that "category structure" (alone) likely does not capture the structure of a theory, and discuss some recent work in light of this claim.

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“…Along similar lines—but beginning with the literature on scientific representation—Nguyen () has recently argued that whether two theories are equivalent should be understood as a question about whether they permit one to model the same “target systems,” and, if they do, whether the models they offer warrant the same claims or inferences about those target systems. He, too, suggests that “purely formal” accounts of theoretical equivalence cannot be sufficient, because they cannot capture the role that intention and interpretation play in the semantics of scientific theories and models.…”

Section: Interpretational Equivalencementioning

confidence: 99%

Part 2: Theoretical equivalence in physics

Weatherall

2019

Philosophy Compass

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I review the philosophical literature on the question of when two physical theories are equivalent. This includes a discussion of empirical equivalence, which is often taken to be necessary, and sometimes taken to be sufficient, for theoretical equivalence; and ''interpretational'' equivalence, which is the idea that two theories are equivalent just in case they have the same interpretation. It also includes a discussion of several formal notions of equivalence that have been considered in the recent philosophical literature, including (generalized) definitional equivalence and categorical equivalence. The article concludes with a brief discussion of the relationship between equivalence and duality. The article is in two parts; this is Part 2, which addresses categorical equivalence, interpretational equivalence, and duality. PREFACEFor reasons related to journal policy, this article has been split into two parts. This is Part 2, which addresses categorical equivalence, interpretational equivalence, and duality; Part 1 addressed empirical equivalence and definitional equivalence. Readers are encouraged to read Part 1 before Part 2.

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Scientific Representation and Theoretical Equivalence

Cited by 16 publications

References 33 publications

What theoretical equivalence could not be

What theoretical equivalence could not be

Why Not Categorical Equivalence?

Part 2: Theoretical equivalence in physics

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