Scoring two-dimensional bids: how cost-effective are agri-environmental auctions?

Evaluating the Potential Contribution of Multi-Attribute Auctions to Achieve Agri-Environmental Targets and Efficient Payment Design

“…), and the public agency (auctioneer) to deal with several attributes in the winners' selection processes (Schilizzi, 2017). Although auctions have received considerable interest, there are only a few studies -in particular in the field of agri-environmental schemes (AESs) -that analyse the opportunity to design multi-attribute tenders within a fixed budget mechanism 1 (Glebe, 2008(Glebe, , 2013Iho et al, 2014). These deals mostly with the theoretical aspects of this design, including the role of an aggregate optimal scoring rule (environmental benefit index -EBI) to evaluate the different types of bids and determine the winners (Jack et al, 2009).…”

“…The bidding model, which is numerically developed with data from the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) 2011 of Emilia-Romagna region (E-R), expands the budget-constrained auction model first introduced by Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoot (1997), and subsequently applied by Viaggi et al (2008) and Glebe (2008Glebe ( , 2013. Compared to its previous design, our model allows farmers to simultaneously bid on two attributes (i.e.…”

Opportunity costs of providing crop diversity in organic and conventional farming: would targeted environmental policies make economic sense?

“…This orientation may be changing: there is growing interest in using auctions as a means to deliver payments for environmental services in agriculture (for a review see, e.g., Latacz-Lohman and Schilizzi 2005). However, given the limited use of auctions in European agriculture, the bulk of the research evaluating such policy instruments is based on pilot studies or experiments and simulations carried out to test auction theory in alternative settings (see, e.g., Bastian et al 2008, Glebe 2008, and Groth 2009. Owing to the hypothetical approach, the bids in experimental auctions do not necessarily reflect farmers' opportunity costs of conservation.…”

The influence of contract length on the performance of sequential conservation auctions

“…The economic performance of conservation auctions has been investigated by many studies. Part of that literature examines how the performance of conservation auctions is influenced by the choice of the bid scoring system (Babcock et al, 1996; Cattaneo et al, 2006; Glebe, 2008; Hajkowicz et al, 2007; Kirwan et al, 2005; Reichelderfer & Boggess, 1988; Ribaudo et al, 2001; Whitten, 2017). Other studies investigate how limited information about the bid scoring system and the bid cap may affect bidding and participation in conservation auctions (Banerjee et al, 2015; Cason et al, 2003; Glebe, 2013; Hellerstein & Higgins, 2017; Jacobs et al, 2014; Messer et al, 2017).…”