Heidegger on Assertion, Method and Metaphysics

Abstract

In Sein und Zeit Heidegger makes several claims about the nature of ‘assertion’ [Aussage]. These claims are of particular philosophical interest: they illustrate, for example, important points of contact and divergence between Heidegger's work and philosophical movements including Kantianism, the early Analytic tradition and contemporary pragmatism. This article provides a new assessment of one of these claims: that assertion is connected to a ‘present‐at‐hand’ ontology. I also indicate how my analysis sets the stage for a new reading of Heidegger's further claim that assertion is an explanatorily derivative phenomenon. I begin with a loose overview of Heidegger's position and then develop a sharper formulation of the key premises. I go on to argue that existing treatments of the supposed link between assertion and the ‘present‐at‐hand’ are unsatisfactory, and advance a new, ‘methodological’, interpretation of that link. Finally, I sketch the implications of my interpretation for the further claim that assertion is explanatorily derivative.

The recent engagement between analytic philosophy and Heideggerian thought: Logic and language

“…Needless to say, all these alternative understandings of assertions and presence‐at‐hand have more nuances than the ones addressed here. However, given the present discussion, it should be clear that all of them “sidestep the aforementioned incoherency” (Schear, , p. 149) and “do not trigger a fatal self‐reference problem” (Golob, , p. 902). They aim at showing that “there is reason to doubt the force and the relevance of [the] paradox [of thematization]” (McManus, , p. 47).…”

“…Finally, Golob argues that, as we reject (some of) the premises that lead an argument to paradoxical conclusions, we should also reject the account of thematic assertions described above because it “generates a self‐reference paradox” (Golob, , p. 885). In agreement with Golob, Schear () rhetorically asks: “How could Heidegger coherently hold that assertions are restricted to present‐at‐hand entities?” (p. 139).…”

“…To begin with, it has been argued that Heidegger's account of thematic assertions is “unacceptable” because “implausible” (Golob, , p. 884). The reason is that, in our everyday life, we do make assertions that are perfectly able to communicate something true about entities that are not present‐at‐hand .…”

“…Golob argues that assertions are about present‐at‐hand entities only if they are accompanied by a certain method. Consistently with the so‐called Wrathall–Carman model, such a method is represented by the activity of “levelling down” (Golob, , p. 889) all the aspects that entities possess to only one of them. For instance, the world around us has a lot of different aspects: Some of them are aesthetical and some others are quantitative.…”

Toward a Resolute Reading of Being and Time: Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and the Dilemma between Inconsistency and Ineffability

“…One way some readers of Heidegger have attempted to avoid the dilemma between these two ways of construing his aims is by denying that he ever meant to pose insurmountable strictures on theoretical logos of the kind I have outlined above. Schear (2007) and Golob (2015) thus argue that theoretical logos is not limited to the representation of present at hand beings ( Vorhandensein ), at least in the sense that it can also be used to represent other kinds of beings, such as the ready to hand ( Zuhandensein ). But their arguments leave untouched what I consider to be the fundamental point, namely that logos is inapt for addressing being .…”