Kurds and thePKK

Abstract

Comprising some thirty to forty million people, the Kurds constitute the fourth largest ethnicity in Western Asia. Divided between Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, Kurdistan is located in the northern part of the Middle East. A sense of national belonging among the Kurds emerged during the course of the twentieth century; it was late and weak by comparison to nationalism among the neighboring Turks, Arabs, and Persians. After the disintegration of the Ottoman empire and the establishment of a new state system in the region from which Turkey, Syria, and Iraq emerged, the Kurds living in those states rebelled on many occasions against physical and cultural genocide. The main Kurdish political actors today are the Kurdistan Regional Government in the north of Iraq, a product of a power‐sharing agreement between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan; the Kurdistan Workers' Party; and the affiliated Democratic Union Party.

The Kobane Generation: Kurdish Diaspora Mobilising in France

“…This largely positive media visibility, and political support by Western countries, however, stood in stark contrast to the criminalisation of the PKK, an organisation that had close ties with the celebrated Syrian Kurdish forces but that nevertheless featured in the EU's and United States' lists of terrorist organisations. The diasporic claims and stances were, thus, also formulated in the context of political ambivalence towards the pro-PKK movement, also because the organisation had considerable mobilisation power through its transnational networks to mobilise Kurdish diaspora communities in Europe, and in particular in France (Grojean 2015;Jongerden & Akkaya 2016).…”

“…One particularity is also the relatively strong support that the pro-PKK movement holds in the country. The PKK has transformed from a military organisation in the 1990s to become a political and social movement that enjoys significant mobilising power and transnational networks in the diaspora, especially in France (Grojean 2015;Jongerden & Akkaya 2016). The mobilisations for Kobane reliedat least to some extent -on such pre-existing networks and associative structures.…”

“…Indeed, Akkaya and Jongerden (2011) suggest that the PKK has reinvented itself in the 2000s, from a 'national liberation struggle' to a project of radical democracy, based on the rejection of the state. Gradually, the organisation has become a political and social movement with extensive transnational networks and connections (Akkaya & Jongerden 2012;Jongerden & Akkaya 2016). One first-generation interviewee active in a pro-PKK organisation reported how the movement had changed over the years:…”

“…The interviewee refers to the mobilising power of the PKK. The PKK, which is the best-known Kurdish organisation, has transformed from a military organisation in the 1990s to become a political and social movement that enjoys a significant mobilising power and transnational networks in the diaspora (Jongerden & Akkaya 2016). One interviewee, active in a pro-PKK organisation, refers to the organisational and political culture that has mobilising power vis-à-vis the diaspora community and which has been actively developed since the 1980s:…”

Looking beyond the state: transitional justice and the Kurdish issue in Turkey

“…In comparison to the neighbouring Turks, Iranian and Arabs, a sense of national belonging emerged late among the Kurds (in the course of the twentieth century) and was relatively weak (politically and military). This made the Kurds a weak actor in the post-WWI/Ottoman power play that resulted in the redrawing of the Middle Eastern political map, leaving the Kurds divided by the new borders marking out Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria (Jongerden and Akkaya 2016). 1 In Turkey, the emergence of Kurdish nationalism was a product of the republic's establishment as a nation state.…”