<scp>The Impact of CEO Turnover on Property–Liability Insurer Performance</scp>

He, Enya; Sommer, David W.; Xie, Xiaoying

doi:10.1111/j.1539-6975.2011.01411.x

Cited by 37 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 44 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…We therefore include measures for Financial Leverage , Reserve Adequacy , and Liquidity . Consistent with He, Sommer, and Xie (), we define Financial Leverage as liabilities divided by policyholders’ surplus. Reserve Adequacy reflects the adequacy of loss reserves and is defined as the ratio of net technical reserves to net premium written.…”

Section: Data and Variable Constructionmentioning

confidence: 99%

RISK GOVERNANCEINTHE INSURANCE SECTOR—DETERMINANTSAND CONSEQUENCESINAN INTERNATIONAL SAMPLE

Magee¹,

Schilling²,

Sheedy³

2017

J of Risk & Insurance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We analyze the relation between risk governance, risk, and performance measures for a global sample of 107 insurance companies from 2004 to 2012. Our risk governance index (RGI) covers several Solvency II provisions and includes the existence of chief risk officer on the executive committee, risk committee characteristics, and board industry experience. We find that in the crisis period 2008–2009, firms with a higher RGI generally have lower expected default frequency. We conclude that during noncrisis years, risk governance does not have a risk‐reducing effect but is positively associated with buy‐and‐hold returns, risk‐adjusted performance measures, and Tobin's Q. Our findings therefore support the role of risk governance as a business enabler rather than inhibitor. Insurance companies typically upgrade their risk governance following a negative shock, especially in countries that are well regulated and have weaker shareholder rights.

show abstract

Section: Data and Variable Constructionmentioning

confidence: 99%

RISK GOVERNANCEINTHE INSURANCE SECTOR—DETERMINANTSAND CONSEQUENCESINAN INTERNATIONAL SAMPLE

Magee¹,

Schilling²,

Sheedy³

2017

J of Risk & Insurance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Cummins and Sommer () and Chen, Steiner, and White () find that when management ownership increases, the interests of managers and owners become more closely aligned, resulting in greater risk taking by managers . He and Sommer () explore the role of ownership structure (i.e., mutual vs. stock ownership) in the sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance, while He, Sommer, and Xie () examine the effect of such turnovers on insurer performance. Both studies confirm the importance of ownership structure for corporate governance and risk taking.…”

Section: Literature Review and Hypothesis Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Governance and Risk Taking: Evidence From the U.K. and German Insurance Markets

Eling¹,

Marek²

2013

J of Risk & Insurance

101

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We analyze the impact of factors related to corporate governance (i.e., compensation, monitoring, and ownership structure) on risk taking in the insurance industry. We measure asset, product, and financial risk in insurance companies and employ a structural equation model in which corporate governance is modeled as a latent factor. Based on this model, we present empirical evidence on the link between corporate governance and risk taking, considering insurers from two large European insurance markets. Higher levels of compensation, increased monitoring (more independent boards with more meetings), and more blockholders are associated with lower risk taking. Our empirical results provide justification for including factors related to corporate governance in insurance regulation.

show abstract

“…Additional studies that explore spillover effects within the insurance industry consider the direct comovement of stock returns across life insurers, PC insurers, and accident and health insurers-three distinct but related markets (Carson, Elyasiani, & Mansur, 2008). Adams & Jiang, 2017;Ames, Hines, & Sankara, 2018;He, Sommer, & Xie, 2011) and firm diversification (e.g., Ai, Bajtelsmit, & Wang, 2018;Elango, Ma, & Pope, 2008;Lee, 2017;Liebenberg & Sommer, 2008;Morris, Fier, & Liebenberg, 2017). Other studies examine performance within a specific line of business, such as automobile insurance (e.g., Bajtelsmit & Bouzouita, 1998;Weiss & Choi, 2008) or medical malpractice insurance (e.g., Born & Boyer, 2011;Lei & Schmit, 2010;Viscusi & Born, 2005).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spillover effects of increased health insurance enrollment on workers’ compensation insurance

Baggett

Cole

Crowley

et al. 2020

Risk Manage Insurance Review

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) was designed to increase the accessibility and affordability of health insurance. While the ACA did not contain direct provisions related to workers’ compensation (WC), because health‐related coverage is a significant portion of WC costs, the ACA could have unintentionally impacted the WC market. Specifically, expanded health insurance enrollment could reduce WC losses and result in higher performance among insurers participating in the WC market. Using insurer‐state level data, we consider the impact of increased health insurance enrollment on the performance of property‐casualty (PC) insurers. Utilizing multiple measures of performance, we find that the post‐ACA period is generally associated with greater profitability for PC insurers operating in the WC market, a positive unintended consequence of this federal regulation.

show abstract

The Impact of CEO Turnover on Property–Liability Insurer Performance

Cited by 37 publications

References 44 publications

RISK GOVERNANCEINTHE INSURANCE SECTOR—DETERMINANTSAND CONSEQUENCESINAN INTERNATIONAL SAMPLE

RISK GOVERNANCEINTHE INSURANCE SECTOR—DETERMINANTSAND CONSEQUENCESINAN INTERNATIONAL SAMPLE

Corporate Governance and Risk Taking: Evidence From the U.K. and German Insurance Markets

Spillover effects of increased health insurance enrollment on workers’ compensation insurance

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About