Second-best urban tolls in a monocentric city with housing market regulations

Abstract

This paper investigates second-best congestion pricing in a monocentric city characterized by distortionary regulations in the housing market (building height restrictions, nodevelopment areas and property taxation). We demonstrate that the welfare gain of a Pigouvian tax may first fall and then increase as building height restrictions become more stringent. For example, a Pigouvian toll imposed in a city without restrictions may produce up to 40% larger welfare gains than Pigouvian tolling in a city with a mild, uniform in space, floor-to-area ratio restriction. In the presence of a tax-induced distortion, deviations of the Pigouvian toll can lead to non-negligible welfare gains. We discuss the important policy implications of the above findings.

Formation and implementation of urban policy using the example of Saransk, Russia

“…Methods of administrative regulation were built according to the adopted concept of spatial development: town planning (the centralized economy) -a town regulation (market economy) -urban development (socially oriented economy) [7,8]. The directiveadministrative, business-oriented and social-oriented approaches correspond to them, the fundamental differences between which are presented in Table 1.…”

Second‐Best Road Taxes in Polycentric Networks with Distorted Labor Markets*

“…Table provides a brief summary of the ORANGE model, which is fully documented in Online Appendix B. ORANGE is a polycentric, network‐based equilibrium model that adopts elements from the monocentric city models by Verhoef () and Tikoudis et al . (2015a, b). It also builds upon Anas and Liu () and other key contributions in the expanding literature of urban CGE models (Anas and Kim, ; Anas and Xu, ; Tscharaktschiew and Hirte, ; Anas and Hiramatsu, ; Hirte and Tscharaktchiew, ; Dröes and Rietveld, ).…”

“… For a parallel distortion that takes the form of a command‐and‐control regulation, see Kono and Kawaguchi () and Tikoudis et al . (2015b). …”

Cordon Pricing and Land‐Use Regulation

“…Among related papers, only Tikoudis et al . () consider both road tolls and FAR regulations. However, their analysis is based on numerical simulations, so theoretical properties are not sufficiently clarified.…”

“…However, these papers exploring congestion pricing do not consider any land-use regulations that are imposed in cities simultaneously. Among related papers, only Tikoudis et al (2015) consider both road tolls and FAR regulations. However, their analysis is based on numerical simulations, so 4 From the point of view of a policymaker, lot-size regulation directly controls population density, whereas building-size regulation controls only the building size without controlling the per capita floor space.…”