Second Mover Disadvantages in a Three-Player Stackelberg Game with Private Information

Shinkai, Tetsuya

doi:10.1006/jeth.1999.2608

Cited by 24 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…(2) Studying an n-stage game and analyzing the first-, second-, third-mover advantage and incentive to determine the decision timing of each player. Shinkai (2000) adopts this approach in a triopoly with linear best replies. From the SC or SS among the three players, the author concludes that the third-mover earns more than the first-mover, who earns more than the second one.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Endogenous timing in the presence of non‐monotonicities

Hoffmann

Rota-Graziosi

2020

Canadian J of Economics

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The aim of this paper is to generalize the endogenous timing game proposed by Hamilton and Slutsky (Games and Economic Behavior, 1990, 2, pp. 29–46) by allowing the payoff or the marginal payoff of a player to become non‐monotonic with respect to the strategy of the opponent. We propose a taxonomy of the subgame‐perfect Nash equilibria based on the characteristics of the payoff functions proposed by Eaton (Canadian Journal of Economics, 2004, 37, pp. 805–29). We determine under which conditions of the initial payoff functions commitment has a social value and when the simultaneous‐move Nash equilibrium is commitment robust and discuss its Pareto efficiency.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Endogenous timing in the presence of non‐monotonicities

Hoffmann

Rota-Graziosi

2020

Canadian J of Economics

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“…Thus, a new provider (e.g., Verizon in the last decade) must be a follower for a while. Shinkai (2000) also provides an interesting example of DRAM (system memory) as a market where a Stackelberg-fashion competition occurs by nature for similar reasons concerning inflexible capacity investment. Whether the leaders.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Welfare-Improving Effect of a Small Number of Followers in a Stackelberg Model

Ino

Matsumura

2016

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

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We investigate a Stackelberg oligopoly model in which m leaders and $N - m$ followers compete. We find an important welfare effect that relates to anti-monopoly policies when we move from the Cournot model ($m = N$) to the Stackelberg model: Exchanging a small number of Cournot firms for Stackelberg followers always improves welfare under moderate conditions. This contrasts with the welfare effect that can reduce welfare when a small number of Cournot firms are exchanged for Stackelberg leaders. The key result behind this asymmetry is the contrasting limit results in the cases where m converges to N and m converges to 0. We also discuss the optimal number of leaders and the integer constraint for the number of firms.

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“…At model equilibrium, the third mover becomes a strategic substitute to the first mover and a strategic complement to the second mover. Under this condition, the second mover earns the lowest expected profit, while the third mover earns the greatest profit (Shinkai 2000). Consequently, this type of economic modeling predicts that the presence of a third mover is a disastrous result for the fast-second launch strategy.…”

Section: Second-mover Lead Timementioning

confidence: 98%

An Empirical Study of Declining Lead Times: Potential Ramifications on the Performance of Early Market Entrants

Poletti

Engelland

Ling

2011

Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice

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This study examines innovation lead time, the construct believed to be the key determinant of launch order strategic value. Anecdotal evidence has suggested that innovation lead times are continuing to decrease as the result of new product development acceleration strategies. However, broad scale empirical evidence regarding product launches since 1984 has not been forthcoming. This study fills the void by comparing lead times for first movers and second movers across a 20-year time span, ending in 2004. Results confirm that first-mover lead times have continued to decrease significantly, whereas second-mover lead times have decreased marginally.

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Second Mover Disadvantages in a Three-Player Stackelberg Game with Private Information

Cited by 24 publications

References 11 publications

Endogenous timing in the presence of non‐monotonicities

Endogenous timing in the presence of non‐monotonicities

Welfare-Improving Effect of a Small Number of Followers in a Stackelberg Model

An Empirical Study of Declining Lead Times: Potential Ramifications on the Performance of Early Market Entrants

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