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We examine the tragedy of the anti‐commons in the long run that is defined as the total output being insufficient from the welfare viewpoint. We develop a common‐resource model with a vertical structure: an upstream owners' market and a downstream users' market. We compare two situations: a long‐run market and a second‐best scenario. We find the following: (i) the number of users is insufficient (excessive) when the demand parameter is large (small); and (ii) the tragedy of the anti‐commons in the long‐run occurs (does not occur) when the demand parameter is large (small).

This paper provides a simple model that examines a firm's incentive to invest in a network infrastructure through a coalition formation in an open access environment with a deregulated retail market. A regulator is in a dilemma between inducing an incentive for an efficient investment and reducing a distortion generated by imperfect competition. We show that, in that case, the degree of cost-reducing effect of the investment is crucial from a welfare point of view. In particular, when the network investment through a coalition formation creates a large (small, resp.) cost-reducing effect, the regulator can (should not resp.) delegate an investment decision to firms with setting an appropriate level of access charge.

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