The Tragedy of the Anti-Commons in the Long Run in a Common-Resource Economy*

Ohkawa, Takao; Shinkai, Tetsuya; Okamura, Makoto

doi:10.1111/j.1468-5876.2012.00571.x

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…In the process of implementing governance policies, different administrative entities are prone to “hitchhiking,” which makes it difficult to maintain collaborative governance and causes the serious problems of non-collaboration [ 7 ]. However, this non-synergy is due to the existence of such factors as the political ranking system [ 8 ], the division of territorial governance [ 9 ], fiscal decentralization and other fragmentation of property rights [ 10 , 11 , 12 ], and the inequality in economic growth [ 12 ], which lead to the insufficient and uncoordinated use of governance rights and lack the efficient joint defense and governance mechanism.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Health Damage of Air Pollution, Governance Uncertainty and Economic Growth

Zhang

Wang

Shi³

et al. 2023

IJERPH

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The evaluation of environmental and health governance processes is an important part of the innovation and perfection of modern governance systems. Based on the macropanel samples, this paper analyzes the impact of the health damage caused by air pollution (APHD) on economic growth and the related mechanisms accordingly using the moderate model and the threshold model. The results can be concluded as follows: (1) After locking in the health damage perspective, the APHD has a negative impact on economic growth. When other conditions are met, economic growth will significantly drop by 1.233 percent for each unit increase in the APHD index. (2) There is a moderate effect of governance uncertainty in APHD on economic growth with different characteristics. The combination of governance uncertainty and APHD can significantly inhibit economic growth, and this moderating effect has different impacts due to heterogeneous conditions. Spatially, this inhibitory effect is significantly obvious in the eastern, central, and western regions, while the negative effect is significant in areas north of the Huai River with medium and low self-defense ability. Additionally, compared with the delegating of governance power at the municipal level, when the governance power is delegated at the county level, the interaction between the governance uncertainty constructed by income fiscal decentralization and APHD has a less negative economic effect. (3) There is a threshold effect under the conditions of a low level of decentralization of prevention and control, a high level of investment in governance, and a low level of APHD. However, under the condition of a certain APHD level, when the decentralization level of pollution control is higher than 7.916 and the input level of pollution control in GDP is lower than 1.77%, the negative moderating effect can be effectively reduced.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Health Damage of Air Pollution, Governance Uncertainty and Economic Growth

Zhang

Wang

Shi³

et al. 2023

IJERPH

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“…13 13 In both the mixed oligopoly and the private oligopoly, the number of entering firms in the free entry equilibrium is excessive; this yields these results. See Mankiw and Whinston (1986), Suzumura and Kiyono (1987), Ohkawa et al . (2005, 2012), Matsumura and Kanda (2005), and Wang and Chen (2010).…”

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confidence: 99%

Market Structure and Privatization Policy Under International Competition*

Matsumura

Tomaru

2012

Japanese Economic Review

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We investigate the relations among market structure, privatization, and tax‐subsidy policies. We find that if there is no foreign competitor, privatization does not matter under the optimal tax‐subsidy policy regardless of the number of firms. However, this is not true if there are foreign competitors; further, privatization is more likely to improve welfare when the number of firms is larger even under the optimal tax‐subsidy policy. We also investigate two Stackelberg models: public leadership and private leadership. We find that private leadership yields a larger (smaller) total social surplus than public leadership when the presence of foreign firms among the private firms is small (large).

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“…In the literature on mergers, Economides and Salop (1992) and Brito and Catalão-Lopes (2010) show that in an oligopolistic market for composite goods that are made up of two components, the merger of all component producers can reduce the price of the composite goods. We note, however, that Salant et al (1983), using a Cournot model with linear demand and a constant marginal cost, show that firms have an incentive to merge when the resulting entity would constitute more than 80 per cent of the market share, but such a 21 On the tragedy of the anticommons, see Buchanan and Yoon (2000) and Ohkawa et al (2012). merger would increase the equilibrium price and reduce social welfare.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 92%

Does the Excess Entry Theorem Hold in a Differentiated Oligopoly?

Kagitani

Ohkawa

Okamura

2015

The Manchester School

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Though it is generally believed that increasing competition improves social welfare, we are able to show with a Shubik-Levitan demand function for differentiated goods that this is not always the case. Under Cournot and Bertrand competition, market entry increases the equilibrium total output and lowers the equilibrium price in the case of substitutes, but it reduces the total output and raises the price in the case of complements. In the long run, the equilibrium number of firms is excessive and the equilibrium cannot achieve even the second-best social welfare under either type of competition, regardless of product substitutability or complementarity.

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The Tragedy of the Anti-Commons in the Long Run in a Common-Resource Economy*

Cited by 6 publications

References 39 publications

Health Damage of Air Pollution, Governance Uncertainty and Economic Growth

Health Damage of Air Pollution, Governance Uncertainty and Economic Growth

Market Structure and Privatization Policy Under International Competition*

Does the Excess Entry Theorem Hold in a Differentiated Oligopoly?

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