Secularism and Security: France, Islam, and Europe

Postsecularism, piety and fanaticism

“…As I already mentioned, Talal Asad, in his reading of the French headscarf law, uses this distinction to criticize the scarf’s interpretation in terms of a sign, stressing that for the wearer, wearing a scarf may form part of a ‘way of being’ in the first place (2006: 501). Now like Asad, I do think that this is a relevant and legitimate (self-)interpretation, and one that could back up a claim to freedom of conscience by the wearers (see further Jansen, 2010). However, at the same time, I do not think it is a secularist misunderstanding of piety at the epistemological level which leads some of the French fellow citizens (and policy-makers) to privilege the communicative context.…”

“…Moreover, the actual debates in political philosophy were mostly about religious reasons in political debate, not about religious attire. Significantly, in the French and Turkish contexts in which the headscarf has been most hotly contested, wearing one has often been interpreted as an act of (hidden) political communication, rather than the execution of a religious obligation (see Asad, 2006; Jansen, 2010).…”

“… 6. I mainly reflect on Mahmood’s critique of secularism, but I will also refer to the closely related work of Talal Asad and Charles Hirschkind. William Connolly has reflected upon the meaning of Asad’s work within a political philosophical framework before (Connolly, 2006); for a comment on Asad’s and Connolly’s critiques of secularism in the context of the French debates about laïcité, see Jansen (2010). …”

“…The motive that constituted the broad consensus for banning the scarves from school was not a wish for a general ban on religious expression in the public sphere, although this was a motive for some secularist ‘diehards'. The consensus , though, was based on a shared suspicion of the politics that might be ‘behind’ the scarves (Jansen, 2010).…”

Komparativ sekularisme – en forskningsdagsorden med konfliktmodererende potentiale

“…Begrundelserne var i den nye runde langt tydeligere formuleret i termer af trusler (en sikkerhedsliggørelse, ville nogen sige), så en normal rettighed (religionsfrihed) måtte vige pga. exceptionelle forhold (Gunn, 2004: 456-479;Holm, 2004;Jansen, 2010). Den offentlige orden var truet af pigernes tørklaeder, fordi de tolkedes som tvang -påtvunget af familien og en militant ideologi.…”