Implicit and explicit indicators of attitudes or personality traits are positively, and variably, related. This review places the question of implicit -explicit consistency into the tradition of attitude/trait -behaviour consistency (e.g., Wicker, 1969). Drawing on dual-process models, such as the recent distinction between associative and propositional representations (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), we identify a working model of implicit -explicit consistency that organises the empirical evidence on implicit -explicit moderation into five factors: translation between implicit and explicit representations (e.g., representational strength, awareness), additional information integration for explicit representations (e.g., need for cognition), properties of explicit assessment (e.g., social desirability concerns), properties of implicit assessment (e.g., situational malleability), and research design factors (e.g., sampling bias, measurement correspondence).A significant proportion of psychological research over the last three decades concerns the automatic nature of information processing (Bargh, 1997;Khilstrom, 1999;Wegner & Bargh, 1998). Theory and empirical data have broadened notions of core psychological concepts like attitudes, stereotypes, self-concept, goals, personality, and self-esteem to include not Correspondence should be addressed to Wilhelm Hofmann, Fachbereich 8 -Psychologie Universita¨t Koblenz-Landau, Fortstraße 7, 76829 Landau, Germany. Email: hofmannw@ uni-landau.de Preparation of this chapter was supported by a grant from the German Science Foundation (DFG) to Manfred Schmitt (Schm 1092/5-1) and by a grant from the National Institute of Mental Health to Brian Nosek (R01 MH-068447). We would like to thank Rainer Banse, Boris Egloff, Malte Friese, Bertram Gawronski, and Jane Thompson for valuable comments on an earlier version of this chapter.EUROPEAN REVIEW OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2005, 16, 335 -390 2005 European Association of Experimental Social Psychology http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/pp/10463283.html DOI: 10.1080/10463280500443228 just the explicit assessments that are products of introspection, but also implicit components of these constructs that may occur outside of conscious awareness or control (Asendorpf, Banse, & Mu¨cke, 2002;Greenwald & Banaji, 1995;Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). Whereas implicit constructs are assumed to operate automatically and may be inaccessible to conscious experience, their explicit counterparts are conceptualised as reflective (conscious) and capacity-consuming mental representations that influence action through deliberation (e.g., Bargh, 1994;Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). This distinction plays a role in a variety of dual-process theories that distinguish two modes of information processing such as implicit vs explicit (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995;Wilson et al., 2000), automatic vs controlled (Bargh, 1994), impulsive vs reflective (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), and associative vs rule-based (Sloman, 1996;Smith & DeCoster, 2000). These theories share an assumpti...