Secure Deployment of Components

Grechanik, Mark; Perry, Dewayne E.

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-24848-4_12

Cited by 4 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…A more robust mechanism for guaranteeing the deployment of component is the S-CODEP (SECure COmponent DEPloyment) protocol [5]. It is based on Kerberos, and provides an anti-replay mechanism.…”

Section: Secure Deploymentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Supporting the Secure Deployment of OSGi Bundles

Parrend

Frénot

2007

2007 IEEE International Symposium on a World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks

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Section: Secure Deploymentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Supporting the Secure Deployment of OSGi Bundles

Parrend

Frénot

2007

2007 IEEE International Symposium on a World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks

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“…In [6] a scenario is described in which components impersonate other components. This is not possible in a content-addressable file system with static component composition (e.g., Unix dynamic libraries with RPATHs pointing to the full paths of components to link against, as happens in the Nix Packages collection).…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Secure sharing between untrusted users in a transparent source/binary deployment model

Dolstra

2005

Proceedings of the 20th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated Software Engineering

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The Nix software deployment system is based on the paradigm of transparent source/binary deployment: distributors deploy descriptors that build components from source, while client machines can transparently optimise such source builds by downloading pre-built binaries from remote repositories. This model combines the simplicity and flexibility of source deployment with the efficiency of binary deployment. A desirable property is sharing of components: if multiple users install from the same source descriptors, ideally only one remotely built binary should be installed. The problem is that users must trust that remotely downloaded binaries were built from the sources they are claimed to have been built from, while users in general do not have a trust relation with each other or with the same remote repositories. This paper presents three models that enable sharing: the extensional model that requires that all users on a system have the same remote trust relations, the intensional model that does not have this requirement but may be suboptimal in terms of space use, and the mixed model that merges the best properties of both. The latter two models are achieved through a novel technique of hash rewriting in content-addressable component stores, and were implemented in the context of the Nix system.

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“…Component-based systems have multiple points of attack. Recently we discovered a variation of the impersonation attack and solution based on Kerberos was offered for component-based systems [6]. We need a protocol that is specific for component-based systems, offers comprehensive protection, and works seamlessly with CASSIA.…”

Section: Rationalementioning

confidence: 99%

“…SCOP is based on the S-CODEP protocol [6] which itself is based on the Kerberos protocol [7] [8]. We prove the soundness of SCOP in a separate technical report [9] using BAN authentication logic [10].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Security Mechanism for Component-Based Systems

Grechanik

Perry

Batory

Fifth International Conference on Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS)-Based Software Systems (ICCBSS'05)

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Security, scalability, and performance are critical for large-scale component-based applications. Weaving security solutions into the fabric of component-based architectures often worsens the scalability and performance of the resulting system. In this paper we analyze the sources of nonscalability and conduct an empirical study that shows that close to 80% of interactions between components and their clients in different commercial systems occur within protected security boundaries. Based on these findings we propose a novel scalable security mechanism for componentbased systems called Component Adaptive Scalable Secure Infrastructure Architecture (CASSIA). CASSIA utilizes the topology of the security boundaries and patterns of interactions among components to achieve noticeable improvements in scalability and performance for component-based applications. We conduct a case study that confirms the scalability of CASSIA, and propose a Secure COmponent Protocol (SCOP) that incorporates our mechanism into a component infrastructure.

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Secure Deployment of Components

Cited by 4 publications

References 6 publications

Supporting the Secure Deployment of OSGi Bundles

Supporting the Secure Deployment of OSGi Bundles

Secure sharing between untrusted users in a transparent source/binary deployment model

A Security Mechanism for Component-Based Systems

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