Securing Property in Contemporary Kyrgyzstan

Spector, Regine A.

doi:10.2747/1060-586x.24.2.149

Cited by 28 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…36 In open-ended comments during the interviews, many of those who had given this explanation a low value on the questionnaire provided evidence which suggested that identity 34 On business elites as vital actors in opposition politics, see Radnitz (2010). 35 On the relationship between business and politics in Kyrgyzstan, and the role of the parliament as a form of bazaar, see Spector (2008). 36 Identity politics are key to an understanding of political behavior in much of the developing world.…”

Section: Identity Politicsmentioning

confidence: 97%

The Barriers to Intra-Opposition Cooperation in the Post-Communist World: Evidence from Kyrgyzstan

Huskey

Iskakova

2010

Post-Soviet Affairs

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What explains the failure of the opposition in many post-communist states to emerge as a legitimate and enduring force in politics? Based on saturation interviewing of Kyrgyzstan's elite and the literature on Krygyzstani politics, this article examines opposition attitudes and beliefs. Opposition elites' ideas about relations between government and opposition and within the opposition itself are detailed and analyzed to understand how political actors view incentives and constraints created by their individual resources and the political and economic environment. In this case study, several assumptions of the comparative literature on oppositions in authoritarian and hybrid regimes are tested in analyzing the forms, logic, and limits of opposition in post-communist states.

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Section: Identity Politicsmentioning

confidence: 97%

The Barriers to Intra-Opposition Cooperation in the Post-Communist World: Evidence from Kyrgyzstan

Huskey

Iskakova

2010

Post-Soviet Affairs

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“…The transformation of the legislative branch of power into an organ for protecting or generating wealth provides an instructive case. In Kyrgyzstan, Regine Spector (, 165) notes that the parliament's political power became less connected to its legislative duties than its mutation into an extra legal state body for protecting legally questionable or plainly illegal transactions through representation in the legislature.…”

Section: Why Invest?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The State as Investment Market: A Framework for Interpreting the Post‐Soviet State in Eurasia

Engvall

2013

Governance

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What type of state has emerged in post‐Soviet Eurasia, and what kind of theoretical framework can help us understand its behavior and performance? This article argues that we can usefully understand the logic of political and administrative organization in terms of a kind of “investment market.” Access to the state is frequently determined by actual financial payment. Would‐be officials invest in offices to obtain access to a stream of income associated with an office. This framework represents a novel perspective on the post‐Soviet state, which has hitherto either been premised on modernization theory or emphasized a robustly personalistic logic of political organization.

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“…Indeed, the point is precisely that this is not what happens. Instead, the argument is that divided-executive constitutions produce incentives that (unlike presidentialist constitutions) significantly complicate 97 As documented in Spector 2008;Ozcan 2010. 98 E.g., Segodnia, May 15, 2010Telekrytyka, July 12, 2010.…”

Section: Kyrgyzstan: Presidentialist Constitution and Single-pyramid mentioning

confidence: 99%

Formal Constitutions in Informal Politics: Institutions and Democratization in Post-Soviet Eurasia

Hale¹

2011

World Pol.

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How do formal constitutions impact the prospects for democratization in hybrid regimes, where corruption is typically high and rule of law weak? It is often assumed either that they set “rules of the game,” having effects by being followed, or that they do not matter, being overwhelmed by informal politics. In fact, a logic of collective action reveals that constitutions do matter, but as much by shaping informal political arrangements as by being obeyed. Presidentialist constitutions, through an information effect and a focal effect, generate expectations of future informal power that encourage clientelistic networks to coordinate law-disregarding practices around a “single pyramid” of power led by the president. The information and focal effects of divided-executive constitutions, by contrast, create expectations that complicate the coordination of clientelistic networks around a single patron, promoting “competing-pyramid” politics. To isolate the impact of formal constitutional design and rule out other causes, a tightly controlled process-tracing paired comparison is employed using Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan during 2005–10, explaining why Ukraine's Orange Revolution produced a true democratic opening (even if short lived) while Kyrgyzstan's Tulip Revolution did not.

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Securing Property in Contemporary Kyrgyzstan

Cited by 28 publications

References 18 publications

The Barriers to Intra-Opposition Cooperation in the Post-Communist World: Evidence from Kyrgyzstan

The Barriers to Intra-Opposition Cooperation in the Post-Communist World: Evidence from Kyrgyzstan

The State as Investment Market: A Framework for Interpreting the Post‐Soviet State in Eurasia

Formal Constitutions in Informal Politics: Institutions and Democratization in Post-Soviet Eurasia

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