2006 IEEE International Workshop on Factory Communication Systems 2006
DOI: 10.1109/wfcs.2006.1704168
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Security in networked building automation systems

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Cited by 50 publications
(37 citation statements)
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“…However, the interconnectivity of BAS enables remote attacks. Attacks on BAS can focus on gaining physical access to a building [8] (e.g., by exploiting window or door actuators), on gaining access to an organizational intranet [9], on terrorist attacks [8] (e.g., turning off fire alarms before a fire is placed), on monitoring inhabitants [10], or on disabling a building's functionality via denial-of-service (DoS) attacks [11].Čeleda et al [12] and Szlósarczyk et al [13] showed that different types of DoS attacks exist for BAS. As pointed out by Bowers [14], BACnet devices are not robust enough to deal with abnormal traffic, since protocol implementations are vulnerable to malformed packets and various forms of attacks.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, the interconnectivity of BAS enables remote attacks. Attacks on BAS can focus on gaining physical access to a building [8] (e.g., by exploiting window or door actuators), on gaining access to an organizational intranet [9], on terrorist attacks [8] (e.g., turning off fire alarms before a fire is placed), on monitoring inhabitants [10], or on disabling a building's functionality via denial-of-service (DoS) attacks [11].Čeleda et al [12] and Szlósarczyk et al [13] showed that different types of DoS attacks exist for BAS. As pointed out by Bowers [14], BACnet devices are not robust enough to deal with abnormal traffic, since protocol implementations are vulnerable to malformed packets and various forms of attacks.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There is some research on securing BMS networks and connected devices using special protocols or systems preventing unauthorised operations [9,10]. The main issue of this approach is a very limited computational power and a lack of other resources available in such devices [11].…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Depending on the security requirements of the application, a secured channel may guarantee different security objectives. These are data integrity, freshness and/or confidentiality [2]. To achieve the security objectives, security mechanisms are necessary.…”
Section: Secure Communicationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, devices must agree on a common mechanism to generate the dynamic node key set. This can, for example, be a monotonically increasing counter or a (exchanged) nonce, which are then used by both partners to derive the dynamic node key set [2].…”
Section: • Secure Point-to-point Process Data Communicationmentioning
confidence: 99%