Security of subcarrier wave quantum key distribution against the collective beam-splitting attack

Miroshnichenko, G. P.; Kozubov, Anton; Gaidash, Andrei; Gleim, A.V.; Horoshko, D. B.

doi:10.1364/oe.26.011292

Cited by 50 publications

(49 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…In order to achieve constructive interference, Bob should use ϕ 0 as an offset for his phase and apply microwave phase ϕ ϕ ϕ = + B 0 in his modulator. According to 36 , the average number of photons arriving at the first arm of Bob's detector in the transmission window T is…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thirdly, recent experiments 40 have shown that preservation of SCW quantum signal parameters in respect to the carrier allows transmitting phase-encoded quantum signals through the air providing invariance to telescope rotation that remains an important obstacle in traditional polarization-based free-space quantum communication, making the same QKD kit suitable for fiber and free-space QKD networks. Security proof of SCW QKD protocol with discrete variables against collective beam-splitting attack was proposed in 36 , and more recently general finite-key security proof was presented in 41 .…”

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confidence: 99%

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Subcarrier wave continuous variable quantum key distribution with discrete modulation: mathematical model and finite-key analysis

Samsonov

Goncharov

Gaidash

et al. 2020

Sci Rep

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In this paper we report a continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocol using multimode coherent states generated on subcarrier frequencies of the optical spectrum. We propose a coherent detection scheme where power from a carrier wave is used as a local oscillator. We compose a mathematical model of the proposed scheme and perform its security analysis in the finite-size regime using fully quantum asymptotic equipartition property technique. We calculate a lower bound on the secret key rate for the system under the assumption that the quantum channel noise is negligible compared to detector dark counts, and an eavesdropper is restricted to collective attacks. Our calculation shows that the current realistic system implementation would allow distributing secret keys over channels with losses up to 9 dB. Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a method of sharing symmetric cryptographic keys between two parties that is based on encoding information in the states of quantum objects and subsequent distillation of the key through a classic communication channel. The first quantum cryptography protocols exploited the quantum system with degrees of freedoms 1-3. A numerous amount of different techniques for security proofs for discrete variable QKD systems has already been presented 4-13. Experimental implementations of this family of QKD protocols rely on single-photon detectors for quantum state measurements. In turn, continuous-variable QKD (CV-QKD), which was proposed later, relies on methods of coherent detection, homodyne or heterodyne, for gaining information about the quantum states. In other words, single-photon detection is replaced by conventional optical communication methods. However, security proofs for CV-QKD protocols currently remain less advanced 14,15. There are two types of CV protocols that differ by signal modulation method: Gaussian 16,17 , where the complex amplitudes of coherent states are selected randomly from a normal distribution, and discrete modulation (DM) 18-22 with weak coherent phase-coded states. Other CV-QKD protocols are based on two-mode squeezed vacuum states transmission and measurement via homodyne or heterodyne detection 23. Security proofs for Gaussian CV-QKD protocols remain the most developed: they were presented against general attacks in the finite key regime using several different approaches 24. Security analysis for CV-QKD protocol with two-mode squeezed vacuum states was also performed 25,26. Discrete-variable CV-QKD protocols possess several important advantages; among those are relative implementation simplicity and a possibility to minimize the number of parameters that need to be monitored. Nevertheless, security proofs for discrete-modulation CV-QKD systems require special consideration. In the asymptotic limit, its security has been proven against collective attacks 27. Recently it was shown that security proof for CV-QKD with discrete modulation against general attacks is possible 27. Here we propose an implementation of CV-QKD protocol based on subcarrier wa...

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Subcarrier wave continuous variable quantum key distribution with discrete modulation: mathematical model and finite-key analysis

Samsonov

Goncharov

Gaidash

et al. 2020

Sci Rep

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“…The authors show the possibility of implementing a strong reference technique by monitoring the intensity of the carrier wave. A version of the BB84-like protocol with phase modulation has recently been demonstrated by several authors of this work in [7][8][9]18]. Proposed in the latter papers approach allows to decode only one state in each «basis» (the word basis only means two states with the phase difference ±π).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Examples are point-to-point [1,2] and twin-field systems with three parties [3][4][5][6]. Further examples are systems based on phase modulated multi-frequency states known as subcarrier wave QKD (SCW QKD) [7,8]. In addition, the state preparation approach utilized in SCW QKD can also be applied to a twin-field QKD system [9].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Influence of Signal Polarization on Quantum Bit Error Rate for Subcarrier Wave Quantum Key Distribution Protocol

Gaidash

Kozubov

Medvedeva

et al. 2020

Entropy

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In this paper, we consider the influence of a divergence of polarization of a quantum signal transmitted through an optical fiber channel on the quantum bit error rate of the subcarrier wave quantum key distribution protocol. Firstly, we investigate the dependence of the optical power of the signal on the modulation indices’ difference after the second phase modulation of the signal. Then we consider the Liouville equation with regard to relaxation in order to develop expressions of the dynamics of the Stokes parameters. As a result, we propose a model that describes quantum bit error rate for the subcarrier wave quantum key distribution depending on the characteristics of the optical fiber. Finally, we propose several methods for minimizing quantum bit error rate.

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“…The purpose of this work is to investigate the vulnerability to the faked-state attack of another single-photon detector, ID Quantique ID210, which is currently commercially available [28] and has recently been used in several QKD setups [29][30][31]. Notably some of these experimental schemes are based on subcarrier-wave (SCW) QKD architecture where quantum states are formed at spectral sidebands of an intense light through phase modulation [32].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Controlling single-photon detector ID210 with bright light

Chistyakov¹,

Huang²,

Egorov³

et al. 2019

Opt. Express

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We experimentally demonstrate that a single-photon detector ID210 commercially available from ID Quantique is vulnerable to blinding and can be fully controlled by bright illumination. In quantum key distribution, this vulnerability can be exploited by an eavesdropper to perform a fakedstate attack giving her full knowledge of the key without being noticed. We consider the attack on standard BB84 protocol and a subcarrier-wave scheme, and outline a possible countermeasure.

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Security of subcarrier wave quantum key distribution against the collective beam-splitting attack

Cited by 50 publications

References 27 publications

Subcarrier wave continuous variable quantum key distribution with discrete modulation: mathematical model and finite-key analysis

Subcarrier wave continuous variable quantum key distribution with discrete modulation: mathematical model and finite-key analysis

The Influence of Signal Polarization on Quantum Bit Error Rate for Subcarrier Wave Quantum Key Distribution Protocol

Controlling single-photon detector ID210 with bright light

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