Seeing through eyes, mirrors, shadows and pictures

Yetter-Chappell, Helen

doi:10.1007/s11098-017-0948-8

Cited by 8 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…For example, Cohen and Meskin ( 2004 , 201) have argued that we do not literally see through photographs. Also, Helen Yetter-Chappell ( 2018 , 2032–2038) has recently argued that we can literally see through handmade drawings. But all of these philosophers do agree that, unlike handmade drawings, photographs provide us with a connection to objects and events that is not mediated by the cognitive processes of another human being.…”

Section: Alternative Explanations Of the Epistemic Threatmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Epistemic Threat of Deepfakes

Fallis

2020

Philos. Technol.

120

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Deepfakes are realistic videos created using new machine learning techniques rather than traditional photographic means. They tend to depict people saying and doing things that they did not actually say or do. In the news media and the blogosphere, the worry has been raised that, as a result of deepfakes, we are heading toward an "infopocalypse" where we cannot tell what is real from what is not. Several philosophers (e.g., Deborah Johnson, Luciano Floridi, Regina Rini) have now issued similar warnings. In this paper, I offer an analysis of why deepfakes are such a serious threat to knowledge. Utilizing the account of information carrying recently developed by Brian Skyrms (2010), I argue that deepfakes reduce the amount of information that videos carry to viewers. I conclude by drawing some implications of this analysis for addressing the epistemic threat of deepfakes.

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Section: Alternative Explanations Of the Epistemic Threatmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Epistemic Threat of Deepfakes

Fallis

2020

Philos. Technol.

120

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“…If we can literally see through mirrors and pictures (e.g. Yetter‐Chappell, 2018), then does the same hold for highlights in which the structure of the scene is partially visible? Or in the case of mirrored, irregular surfaces, does this require switching between seeing surfaces as mirrors to the scene, or as the scene as a reflected texture that contains important diagnostic distortions for resolving surface shape (Fleming et al., 2004)?…”

Section: Materials and Puzzles Of Perceptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Material perception for philosophers

et al. 2021

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Common everyday materials such as textiles, foodstuffs, soil or skin can have complex, mutable and varied appearances. Under typical viewing conditions, most observers can visually recognize materials effortlessly, and determine many of their properties without touching them. Visual material perception raises many fascinating questions for vision researchers, neuroscientists and philosophers, yet has received little attention compared to the perception of color or shape. Here we discuss some of the challenges that material perception raises and argue that further philosophical thought should be directed to how we see materials.

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“…2 Proponents of this claim include Walton (1984), Lopes (1996Lopes ( , 2010, Martin (2012), andYetter-Chappell (2018).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The particularity of photographic experience

Jagnow

2023

Theoria

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A common view in the philosophy of perception holds that states of seeing objects face to face have particular contents. When you see, say, a dog face to face, your visual state represents the particular dog that is in front of you. In this paper, I argue for a related claim about states of seeing objects in conventional photographs. When you see a dog in a photograph, for example, your visual state represents the particular dog that was in front of the camera when the photograph was taken, that is, the photograph's depictum. The argument in this paper proceeds in two steps. In the first step, I discuss states of seeing objects face to face. I argue that such a state represents the particular object whose surface is responsible for the optical information that the visual system uses to construct the state's attributive representational content. In the second step, I apply the result of this discussion to states of seeing objects in photographs. I argue that a state of seeing an object in a photograph has a particular content that represents the object that was in front of the camera when the photograph was taken.

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Seeing through eyes, mirrors, shadows and pictures

Cited by 8 publications

References 13 publications

The Epistemic Threat of Deepfakes

The Epistemic Threat of Deepfakes

Material perception for philosophers

The particularity of photographic experience

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