Seeking peace and security in the Horn of Africa: the contribution of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development

Abstract

This article assesses the contribution that IGAD has made to regional security in the Horn of Africa since the adoption of its peace and security mandate in 1996. It describes the evolution of IGAD and its mandate in the context of regional conflict and wider African peace and security processes. It explores the local dynamics of the two major IGAD‐led peace processes, in Sudan (1993–2005) and in Somalia (2002–2004), and discusses the effectiveness of IGAD's institutional role. A consideration of the wider impact of the peace agreements highlights the way IGAD has enhanced its role by setting the agenda on peace support operations in Somalia. The article concludes that IGAD's successes are more the result of regional power politics than of its institutional strength per se. Despite the obvious need for a better regional security framework, the scope for the IGAD Secretariat to develop an autonomous conflict‐resolution capability will remain limited. However, IGAD brings a new diplomatic dimension to conflict management that locks in regional states and locks out interested parties beyond the region. With regard to Somalia, the organization has played a pivotal role in directing African and wider international responses to conflict in the region.

The Social Construction of Development Cooperation Success and Failure

“…However, the form of IGAD is bound to mirror the many different interests of the actors involved in it (Borchgrevink and Lie, 2009). These interests necessarily reflect the ontological point of departure of each given actor and are linked to its own distinctive pre-perceptions (Healy, 2011;Mulugeta, 2014). In development work and relations of development aid, these may conflict with one another, causing misunderstandings of contexts.…”

“…At the time of the study IGAD had mainly functioned as a political forum -it may have been part of processes in which it apparently assumed an active role of negotiator, but all these had been driven by one or more of the member states, through the framework that is the organisation (Healy, 2011;Mulugeta, 2009). On several occasions, it had proven to be a very effective forum, allowing states that would never have cooperated bilaterally, to come together and seek solutions to issues in the Horn.…”

“…Other studies have given attention to the early warning system within IGAD, CEWARN (Apuuli, 2004;Mwaûra and Schmeidl, 2002;Wulff and Debiel, 2009), to IGAD's role in combating terrorism (Kagwanja, 2006), or its relationship with other East African organisations (Juma, 2003). The criticism of IGAD is fairly widespread, but some still hold that it played an important role in facilitating peace in Sudan before the millennium (Adar, 2000), and that its success is found in its ability to act as a political forum more so than its institutional capacity (Borchgrevink and Lie, 2009;Healy, 2011) Co-occurring with widespread historical criticism, the interest of Western donors in the organisation has steadily risen over the last 10 years. It is interesting why donors find this organisation, often portrayed as incapable of delivering results, so attractive, and how the received amounts of development aid have almost tripled in the last decade (IGAD, 2007;2008;, when it apparently has delivered few substantial results during its many years of existence.…”

Explaining the (il)legality of Uganda's intervention in the current South Sudan conflict

“…The mission failed to materialise partly because the organisation did not possess an in-house capacity to rapidly deploy peacekeepers to member states. 84 According to Sally Healy, 'no resources were available to mount the operation' 85 and no external financial support for the force was found. 86 So IGAD possesses the mandate to deploy peacekeeping/ enforcement missions, but what it lacks (at least in the case of IGASOM) is the capacity to actually do it.…”

The Geopolitics of Insecurity in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula

“…The incidence of maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden Eritrea) were intervening in the military conflict in Sudan, thereby complicating the new organization's mandate. 40 The renamed and restructured Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) took part in two sustained efforts at regional conflict resolution. Between 1993 and 2005, it participated in the process leading up to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that settled the long civil war between north and south Sudan.…”