Seeking the middle ground in the ‘memory wars’

Ost, James

doi:10.1348/000712603762842156

Cited by 30 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…Specifically, despite the diversity in methodologies and results, it often remains unclear whether participants in false memory studies actually remember the suggested false event or merely believe they experienced it. Nevertheless, as we have argued before (Ost, 2003;Smeets et al, 2005), it is important to differentiate between belief and memory. For example, McNally, Clancy, Schacter, and Pitman (2000) found subtle differences between patients with recovered memories of abuse and patients with beliefs about childhood abuse in that patients who merely believed in that they had been abused scored higher on measures of absorption and dissociation compared to patients with recovered memories of abuse, who in turn scored higher than patients who had always remembered their abuse.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 91%

What's behind crashing memories? Plausibility, belief and memory in reports of having seen non‐existent images

Smeets

Telgen

Ost

et al. 2009

Applied Cognitive Psychology

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The present study investigated the precise nature of crashing memory reports: Are they truly memories or are they based on beliefs? We asked 88 individuals whether they had seen non-existent footage of the Pim Fortuyn assassination and conducted thorough post-experimental interviews. Two-thirds of our participants falsely reported having seen the footage, while less than 10% also reported details that they could not have seen. Moreover, plausibility ratings of having seen the images were higher than false belief ratings, which in turn were higher than false memory ratings. After having been fully debriefed, 81% of the participants who reported crashing memories attributed their false report to their lack of a full understanding of the critical question. Another 10% of this subsample stated that they truly remembered the images (i.e. false memories). Thus, only a small subset of crashing memory reports seems to be induced by false beliefs and/or false memories.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 91%

What's behind crashing memories? Plausibility, belief and memory in reports of having seen non‐existent images

Smeets

Telgen

Ost

et al. 2009

Applied Cognitive Psychology

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“…Some may be, some might not be. Some never "got" memories (Ost, 2003). As Bartlett (1932) suggested, reasoning, rather than conscious recollection, is important in inferring the "probable constituents" of one's past, and that socially situated beliefs (or "attitudes") then drive recollection.…”

Section: Conclusion and Wider Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, Ost (2003), drawing on the work of Sir Frederic Bartlett, argued for the primacy of "attitudes" (or beliefs) over recall (or recollection). Rather than directly recalling past events, Bartlett argued that people start by making inferences about their current circumstances based on what must have happened in their past ("This and this and this must have occurred in order that my present state should be what it is"; Bartlett, 1932, p. 202, emphasis added).…”

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confidence: 99%

Adults’ retractions of childhood sexual abuse allegations: high-stakes and the (in)validation of recollection

Ost

2016

Memory

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Retractors are individuals who have repudiated their earlier claims of having been sexually abused. There has been relatively little research conducted with this population. The growing literature on memory verification strategies and non-believed memories provide a conceptual and empirical lens through which to revisit the accounts of these individuals to try and learn more about the process of making and retracting high stake, consequential beliefs or recollections about the past. Do people attempt to validate or invalidate beliefs and recollections of such events in the same way as they do for the moderately significant events studied to date? The paper concludes by re-emphasising the social and contextual nature of remembering and argues for the primacy of belief over recollection.

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“…Based on this burgeoning literature, researchers (DePrince, Allard, Oh, & Freyd, 2004;Ost, 2003;Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003;Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch, & Relyea, 2004;Smeets, Merckelbach, Horselenberg, & Jelicic, 2006) have made a distinction between the concepts of autobiographical belief (believing that an event occurred, whether or not one has an accompanying memory; e.g., most individuals believe they were born, but do not remember the event), and autobiographical memory (remembering the event, with accompanying perceptual detail). This distinction has important implications for understanding false autobiographical remembering.…”

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confidence: 99%

Sothat'swhy I don't remember: Normalising forgetting of childhood events influences false autobiographical beliefs but not memories

Scoboria

Lynn

Hessen

et al. 2007

Memory

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We investigated changes in autobiographical belief and memory ratings for childhood events, after informing individuals that forgetting childhood events is common. Participants received false prevalence information (indicating that a particular childhood event occurred frequently in the population) plus a rationale normalizing the forgetting of childhood events; false prevalence information alone; or no manipulation, for one (Study 1) or two (Study 2) unlikely childhood events. Results demonstrated that combining prevalence information and the "forgetting rationale" substantially influenced autobiographical belief ratings, whereas prevalence information alone had no impact (Study 1) or a significantly lesser impact (Study 2) on belief ratings. Prevalence information consistently impacted plausibility ratings. No changes in memory ratings were observed. These results provide further support for a nested relationship between judgements of plausibility, belief, and memory in evaluating the occurrence of autobiographical events. Furthermore, the results suggest that some purported false memory phenomena may instead reflect the development of autobiographical false beliefs in the absence of memory.

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Seeking the middle ground in the ‘memory wars’

Cited by 30 publications

References 24 publications

What's behind crashing memories? Plausibility, belief and memory in reports of having seen non‐existent images

What's behind crashing memories? Plausibility, belief and memory in reports of having seen non‐existent images

Adults’ retractions of childhood sexual abuse allegations: high-stakes and the (in)validation of recollection

Sothat'swhy I don't remember: Normalising forgetting of childhood events influences false autobiographical beliefs but not memories

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