Segregation, Ethnic Favoritism, and the Strategic Targeting of Local Public Goods

Abstract

This article demonstrates that ethnic segregation is a key determinant of local public goods provision. We argue that this results from politicians’ strategic engagement in ethnic favoritism: Only when ethnic groups are sufficiently segregated can elites efficiently target coethnics with local public goods. We test this expectation with fine-grained data from Malawi on the spatial distribution of ethnic groups, geolocated distributive goods (water wells), and the ethnic identities of political elites. We find that members of parliament provide more local public goods to their electoral districts when ethnic groups are geographically segregated but that this increased investment is primarily targeted toward coethnics. Thus, while segregation promotes overall public goods provision, it also leads to greater favoritism in the distribution of these goods. Our logic and evidence provide an elite-driven explanation for both the considerable variation in ethnic favoritism across contexts and the underprovision of public goods in ethnically diverse settings.

State, Society, and Informality in Cities of the Global South

“…67-68). (Ejdemyr, Kramon, & Robinson, 2015). 11 In the long run, however, increasing urban diversity may erode ethnic clientelism.…”

Rebels, Revenue and Redistribution: The Political Geography of Post-Conflict Power-Sharing in Africa

“…To generate implications that allow us to test this redistributive mechanism more directly, we turn to the literature on public goods provision in ethnically heterogeneous societies. This literature has established that public goods provision in ethnically diverse locations tends to be lower (Ejdemyr, Kramon and Robinson 2018;Tajima, Samphantharak and Ostwald 2018). It is difficult for elites, the argument goes, to identify who will profit from resource allocation if both constituency and non-constituency groups occupy the same area.…”

“…In contrast, and in line with existing research from non-conflict contexts, we show that ethnic favoritism in post-conflict contexts is particularly prevalent in ethnically homogeneous regions. We therefore add to the finding that ethnic segregation can improve partial public goods provision (Ejdemyr, Kramon and Robinson 2018;Tajima, Samphantharak and Ostwald 2018) evidence from a context in which ethnic segregation is particularly salient: in the aftermath of civil war.…”

Who Trusts? Ethnicity, Integration, and Attitudes Toward Elected Officials in Urban Nigeria

“…The first stems from expectations about the purposes of voting and political support in settings of ethnic clientelism. In this context, voters are presumed to throw their support behind coethnics with the expectation that these politicians, if elected, will favor their own core ethnic constituencies in the distribution of benefits and access to government (Bates, 1983;Bratton & Kimenyi, 2008;Carlson, 2015;Ejdemyr, Kramon, & Robinson, 2015;Horowitz, 1985). Those who are ethnic minorities or non-coethnics may receive fewer clientelistic benefits, especially in terms of private transfers, and fewer constituency services than those whom representatives see as core ethnic supporters.…”